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Larry M. Elison* and Dennis NettikSimmons**
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of privacy is essential to the well-being of a free so-
ciety and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compel-
ling state interest.'
From the beginning of recorded history there has been a
strong urge to seek some measure of privacy.2 From caves to
castles, from phone booths to prison cells, the urge to be "let
alone" is evident. Unfortunately, the parallel urge to snoop, in-
fringe upon and control is equally evident. Montana has, in a
sense, responded to both urges. The delegates to the 1972 constitu-
tional convention tentatively discussed privacy, imprecisely and in-
completely considered examples and arguments about privacy, and
then decisively proposed that a right of privacy be included in the
Montana Constitution. Presumptively, the delegates intended to
guarantee the right of privacy to a greater degree than it had been
under either the 1889 Montana Constitution or the federal Consti-
tution, to accord the right unquestioned constitutional significance,
and to insure that privacy encompassed at least the examples
considered.
In May 1985, a decision by the Montana Supreme Court dra-
matically reduced the scope of privacy protection.' It did so in the
course of overruling nearly fifteen year3 of Montana constitutional
case law, case law that protected against the use in criminal pro-
ceedings of evidence that had been illegally seized by private per-
* Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law. A.B., Idaho State College;
J.D., University of Utah; S.J.D., University of Michigan.
** B.A., University of Montana, 1980; M.A., University of Montana, 1985; J.D., Univer-
sity of Montana, 1985.
1. MONT. CONST. art. I, § 9.
2. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). Only industrialized nations have con-
stitutionalized this right. This is probably the case because the complexity and development
of such nations pose a significant threat to privacy.
3. State v. Long, - Mont. -, 700 P.2d 153 (1985).
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sons.' The result reached in the case was surprising although well
supported by precedent outside of Montana. It was traditional
when it could have been innovative; it limited a right which, in an
increasingly complex society, needs to be expanded. As noted by
Justice Sheehy in dissent, Delegate Campbell's remarks in the
Montana Constitutional Convention are no less true today than
when they were made: "Today, with wire taps, electronic and bug-
ging devices, photo surveillance equipment and computerized data
banks, a person's privacy can be invaded without his knowledge
and the information so gained can be misused in the most insidi-
ous ways." 5
The purpose of this article is to articulate the historical and
philosophical underpinnings of the right of privacy, to review the
apparent intentions of the framers of the Montana constitutional
right of privacy, and to analyze how the Montana Supreme Court
has interpreted this right. In short, it is an attempt to understand
the nature of the Montana constitutional right of privacy.
II. LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. Common Law Right of Privacy
Though the term "privacy" was not used, something like the
concept of privacy has been significant in American political
thought since colonial times. Concerns about unreasonable
searches and seizures,6 notions of liberty,7 private property law8
and nuisance laws have always been implicit manifestations of a
sense of privacy. A concept labelled "privacy," however, was not
carefully developed until 1890 in an article by Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis, entitled "The Right to Privacy."10
In that article, the authors argued for the recognition of a
common law right of privacy. Beginning with the premise that
"[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of
new rights,"1 they argued that not only property and reputation
4. See infra text accompanying note 63.
5. Long, - Mont. at -, 700 P.2d at 161 (quoting MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1971-72, Vol. 5, at 1681 (1979) [hereinafter MONT. CONST. CONY.]).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also Declaration of Rights and Grievances, 1765,
quoted in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 196-98 (1971).
7. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,
171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 103-06.
9. Frank, 359 U.S. 360.
10. 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
11. Id. at 193.
[Vol. 48
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but also "[tihoughts, emotions, and sensations demanded legal rec-
ognition."12 Rather than looking at the nature of the injuries re-
sulting from an invasion of privacy, the courts were urged to base
their interpretation of this right on the principle "of an inviolate
personality."' s
In 1904, the Georgia Supreme Court, in Pavesich v. New Eng-
land Life Insurance Co., 4 became the first court to recognize a
common law right to privacy. Acknowledging that there was no
precedent for recognizing this right, the court supported its deci-
sion with an analysis of the right's inchoate existence in other legal
rights and with an observation about the changing social, political
and economic conditions of society. 15
The first common law invasions of privacy actions pertained to
unauthorized use of a person's likeness. As the right of privacy de-
veloped, however, it was invoked to protect other interests. In
1960, Dean Prosser concluded from his examination of privacy
cases that there were: "four distinct kinds of invasion of four dif-
ferent interests ... , which are tied together by the common
name, [privacy], but otherwise have almost nothing in common ex-
cept that each represents an interference with the right of the
plaintiff . . 'to be let alone.' "16 The four different invasions of
privacy that Prosser discovered are: the "[i]ntrusion upon the
plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs";
"[plublic disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plain-
tiff"; "[p]ublicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye," and; appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness
for commercial or similar use. 17 Today, the vast majority of
states,18 including Montana,' 9 have recognized by statute or judi-
cial decision a right to privacy which permits tort actions for inva-
sion of at least one of these aspects of the right of privacy.
B. The Federal Constitution
The story of the federal constitutional right of privacy, like
12. Id. at 195.
13. Id. at 205.
14. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
15. Id. at 193-222, 50 S.E. at 69-78.
16. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
17. Id. at 389.
18. 62 AM. JUR. 2D, Privacy § 3 (1972).
19. See Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) (landlord moving back
into house, while tenant still resided, thereby violating the tenant's right to privacy). See
also MONT. COnE ANN. § 45-8-213 (1985) (making it a crime for anyone other than law en-
forcement officials to intercept telephone transmissions.)
1987]
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the common law right, begins with Louis Brandeis. In his dissent-
ing opinion in Olmstead v. United States,2 ° Justice Brandeis ar-
gued that the fourth amendment protected a person's right of pri-
vacy from invasions by government officials. His interpretation of
the right of privacy, the very "principle underlying the Fourth
Amendment,"' 2' resulted in part from his conviction that if the
right existed in common law against private citizens, it should also
be applicable to the government: "Decency, security, and liberty
alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the
same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. ' 22 Thus,
he could declare:
The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must
be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 2'
The right was subsequently invoked by a majority of the
Court in search and seizure cases as early as 1949 in Wolf v. Colo-
rado.24 In Wolf, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment did
not require state courts to exclude evidence that was obtained by
an unreasonable search and seizure in a prosecution for a state
crime. Nevertheless, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court,
echoed the dissent of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead and held this
right of privacy (though not the exclusionary remedy) applicable to
the States: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intru-
sion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amend-
ment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the con-
cept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause. '25 Twelve years later, when the
Court in Mapp v. Ohio26 decided that the exclusionary rule ought
to be applied to state court proceedings, it reaffirmed the right of
privacy, referring to it as "Wolf's constitutional documentation of
the right to privacy. "27
Finally, in 1969, the Court in Katz v. United States28 articu-
20. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 476.
22. Id. at 485.
23. Id. at 478.
24. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
25. Id. at 27-28.
26. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
27. Id. at 654-55.
28. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
[Vol. 48
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lated what have been the two most significant facets of the nature
of the privacy interest protected by the fourth and fourteenth
amendments. First, the Court emphasized that "the Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional
'right to privacy.' "29 Instead, "the protection of a person's general
right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is, like
the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to
the law of the individual States." 0 Thus, there is an obvious differ-
ence in the scope or extent of the right of privacy to be protected
by state government vis-a-vis the federal government. The scope of
privacy to be protected by the federal government and the U.S.
Constitution should be substantially less comprehensive than that
to be protected by state governments. State governments should
protect all of the privacy protected by the federal Constitution and
more also.31 The theory that directed the creation of the federal
government and which was embodied in the federal Constitution
was of a limited government possessing only enumerated and dele-
gated powers reserving all other conceivable powers of government
to the states or to the people.32 Notwithstanding the enormously
expanded activities of the federal government it has never been
assumed that there is a general police power in the federal govern-
ment such as exists in each of the state governments.
Second, the Katz Court redirected the thrust of the concept of
privacy from the notion of a "constitutionally protected area"33 to
a consideration of the privacy of the person: "[T]he Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." s4 This statement was
brief, clever and inaccurate. Privacy protects persons. It also pro-
tects places. The trespass doctrine that the courts previously had
utilized in fourth amendment search and seizure analyses often
failed to measure up to the provision it attempted to construe.3 6
Thus, the trespass doctrine needed to be supplemented with the
29. Id. at 350.
30. Id. at 350-51.
31. Supra note 30, and infra notes 214-19 and text preceding note 214.
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. 10.
33. 389 U.S. at 351.
34. Id.
35. The trespass doctrine was applied by pre-Katz Courts to construe the fourth
amendment's protection of "persons, houses, papers, and effects." In Olmstead, 277 U.S.
438, the Court held that the fourth amendment only protects "material" things. Thus, since
there was no trespass in tapping the telephone wires, no violation of the defendant's fourth
amendment rights occurred. Compare Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)
(holding that the insertion of a "spike mike" into defendant's wall violated the fourth
amendment). See generally Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Intangible Things: Regula-
tion of Governmental Information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1483, 1493-1497 (1979).
1987]
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admonition that persons are also protected. But it is very impor-
tant to recognize the intimate relationship between persons and
their property; a relationship that undergirds much of Anglo-
American law.36
Katz also articulated a test for what constitutes a "search"
that has been adopted by some state courts in construing their own
explicit state constitutional privacy provisions.37 The majority
opinion in Katz addressed the search and seizure in terms of gov-
ernmental activities which "violated the privacy upon which [Katz]
justifiably relied." 8 It is the test found in Justice Harlan's concur-
ring opinion, however, that has been almost uniformly adopted by
the courts. In order for a privacy interest to be protected by the
fourth amendment, it is necessary "first that a person have exhib-
ited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' 
"30
In addition to the right of privacy underlying the fourth
amendment, the federal Constitution has been successfully in-
voked to protect an aspect of privacy that looks very much like
what in other contexts had been called a "liberty" interest.4 0 In
1965, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut"1 held that laws forbid-
ding the use of contraceptive devices violated "marital privacy. '42
Although the majority vote was based on different theories, six jus-
tices recognized the right of privacy to be a fundamental right pro-
tected by the Constitution.43
36. This is the point on which Warren and Brandeis as well as the Katz Court had to
rely in arguing that privacy logically precedes property. See Warren and Brandeis, supra
notes 10 & 12.
37. See, e.g., City and Borough of Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1984);
People v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20, 26 (Colo. 1984); State v. Fields, - Haw. -, , 686 P.2d
1379, 1390 (1984); State v. Ragsdale, 381 So. 2d 492, 497 (La. 1980); State v. Boggess, 115
Wis. 2d 443, 448 n.8, 340 N.W.2d 516, 520 (1983).
38. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
39. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
40. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down an act requiring
the sterilization of persons convicted two or more times of felonies involving "moral turpi-
tude." The state's classification failed to survive strict scrutiny, which was mandated be-
cause the defendant would have been "deprived of a basic liberty.").
41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
42. Id. at 485.
43. The majority had different rationales, based not on a disagreement about the right
of privacy, but about the source of the right. Justice Douglas writing the opinion for the
Court held that "[v]arious [constitutional] guarantees create zones of privacy." Id. at 484.
Such zones, like the particular guarantees, would be incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment and thus would be applicable to state action. Justices Goldberg and Brennan
and Chief Justice Warren concurred concluding that "the right of marital privacy though
• . . not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution is supported both by numerous decisions
[Vol. 48
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The right of privacy enunciated in Griswold has since been
recognized by the Supreme Court to protect both "the individual
interest in avoiding [accumulation and] disclosure of personal mat-
ters, and. . . the interest in independence in making certain kinds
of important [personal] decisions.""" The personal decisions gener-
ally included are those "relating to marriage, procreation, contra-
ception, family relationships and child rearing and education."'45
The Court has excluded some sexual choices for example, uphold-
ing criminal sodomy statutes."
C. Other State Constitutions
A number of states have recognized a constitutional right of
privacy. The highest courts in some states have followed the
United States Supreme Court's lead and have found an implicit
right of privacy in their state constitutions.47 A number of state
constitutions have explicit provisions protecting the right of pri-
vacy. Some have included a proscription against invasions of pri-
vacy in their search and seizure provision," others have a separate
right of privacy provision. 49 The states of Washington and Arizona,
on the other hand, have no search and seizure provision per se, but
only a general right against illegitimate governmental intrusions:
"No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
• .. and by the language and history of the Ninth Amendment . . . ." Id. at 486-87
(Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Harlan joined the decision because the anti-contraception
statute violated "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Id. at 500
(Harlan, J., concurring). Justice White concurred, finding that that statute was not "reason-
ably necessary for the effectuation of a legitimate and substantial state interest," and was
"arbitrary or capricious in application." Id. at 504 (White, J., concurring).
44. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (holding that a New York law requir-
ing doctors to reveal the names of persons purchasing certain kinds of drugs did not violate
either facet of the right of privacy). For criticism of the Court's failure to distinguish in
practice these two kinds of interests, see Huff, Thinking Clearly About Privacy, 55 WASH. L.
REv. 777 (1980).
45. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
46. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986); Enslin v. Bean, 436 U.S. 912 (1978);
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S.
901 (1976) (homosexual conduct); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd
539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, Lovisi v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 977 (1976)
(sodomous heterosexual conduct).
47. See, e.g., In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 480 A.2d 93 (1984); Commonwealth v.
Beauford, 327 Pa. Super. 253, 475 A.2d 783 (1984); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647
(1976).
48. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10.
49. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12
(Florida also proscribes "unreasonable interception of private communication by any
means" in its search and seizure provision, § 12); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (Hawaii also pros-
cribes "invasions of privacy" in its search and seizure provision, § 7); MONT. CONST. art. II, §
7
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invaded, without authority of law."50
The express right of privacy in some of these states, either by
constitutional amendment 5 or by judicial decisions, 2 has given no
greater protection in search and seizure cases than provided by the
fourth amendment as construed by the United States Supreme
Court. Other state courts, however, have interpreted their state
constitutional rights of privacy to be more protective than the fed-
eral right. They have done so on the basis of express provisions
recognizing privacy, or because the particular state's search and
seizure provision is not identical to the fourth amendment.5 3 Even
when faced with the identical search and seizure provision, some
state courts have simply interpreted the language in a different
and more protective way.5 4
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONTANA RIGHT OF PRIVACY PRIOR TO
THE 1972 CONSTITUTION
The Montana Supreme Court acknowledged a right of privacy
fifty years before an explicit right of privacy was proposed and rat-
ified as a part of the 1972 Montana Constitution. The first consid-
50. ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
51. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12:
This right shall be construed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible
in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions
of the United States Supreme Court construing the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
52. See State v. Lee, - Haw..... 686 P.2d 816, 817-18, (1984); People v.
Hoskins, 101 Ill. 209, 218, 461 N.E.2d 941, 945 (1984).
53. Compare, e.g., Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979); State v. Kaluna, 55
Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974); and State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982) with New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)
(permitting officers to search defendant's automobile pursuant to a custodial arrest); State
v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978) and State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216
(1978) with United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (use of informant carrying con-
cealed transmitter does not violate fourth amendment); State v. Sawyer, 174 Mont. 512, 571
P.2d 1131 (1977) with South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (permitting routine
inventory searches of automobiles impounded when driver is arrested).
54. Compare, e.g., People v. Clyne, 189 Colo. 412, 541 P.2d 71 (1975); People v. Gokey,
60 N.Y.2d 309, 457 N.E.2d 723, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1983), with New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454 (1981); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983) and Commonwealth v. Beauford,
327 Pa. Super. 253, 475 A.2d 783 (1984) with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (de-
fendant had no expectation of privacy in his telephone records); Charnes v. DeGiacormo,
200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117 (1980); and Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d
1283 (1979), with United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (defendant had no expecta-
tion of privacy in his bank records). The thrust of this article is not directed toward the
intrinsic value of the exclusionary rule in protecting the citizens' right of privacy. Nonethe-
less, it would be interesting to know how many tort, crime or administrative remedies have
been effectuated in a case which initially focused on the exclusion of evidence.
8
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eration of any aspect of the right of privacy within Montana was
the Montana Supreme Court's initial interpretation of the search
and seizure provision of the 1889 Montana Constitution. In State
ex rel. Samlin v. District Court,55 the court held that the defend-
ant's whiskey had been seized pursuant to a defective warrant and
ordered that the whiskey be returned. Having noted that the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution was not ap-
plicable to actions by state officials, the court approved of the in-
terpretation of the fourth amendment given by the United States
Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States56 and held that the 1889
Montana Constitution was "expressive of the same fundamental
principles and was intended to be equally as effective to prevent an
invasion of the rights of the citizen of the state under the guise of
law by the state government or any of its officers."5
Several years later, in State ex rel. King v. District Court,58
the Montana Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Samlin and
required that evidence seized pursuant to a defective warrant be
excluded. In King, the court first articulated the relationship be-
tween the Montana Constitution's warrant requirement and the in-
dividual's right of privacy. The court declared:
The power to make searches and seizures is absolutely necessary
to the public welfare.. . . But the process may be invoked only in
furtherance of public prosecutions. Statutes providing for their is-
suance and execution are sustained under the constitutional pro-
visions forbidding unreasonable search and seizure only as neces-
sary means in the suppression of crime and the detection and
punishment of criminals, and these are required to be cautiously
framed and carefully pursued, in order that the constitutional
rights of citizens may not be invaded.. . . The warrant must des-
ignate the premises to be searched and contain a description so
specific and accurate as to avoid any unnecessary or unauthorized
invasion of the right of privacy.5 9
The common law right of privacy was recognized by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court in 1952 in Welsh v. Roehm.60 Following the
rationales of other state courts, the Welsh court stated that "[t]he
'right of privacy' is embraced within the absolute rights of personal
security and personal liberty"'" and agreed that "[t]he basis of the
55. 59 Mont. 600, 198 P. 362 (1921).
56. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
57. Samlin, 59 Mont. at 609, 198 P. at 365.
58. 70 Mont. 191, 224 P. 862 (1924).
59. Id. at 197-98, 224 P. at 864-65 (emphasis added).
60. 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952).
61. Id. at 523, 241 P.2d at 819.
1987]
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'right of privacy' is the 'right to be let alone' and [that] it is 'a part
of the right to liberty and pursuit of happiness."'
In the late 1960s, the Montana Supreme Court was required to
consider challenges to searches and seizures based on the federal
Constitution. Thus, the court had to apply the justifiable expecta-
tion of privacy test that had been announced in Katz."s
In State v. Brecht,6" the Montana Supreme Court held that to
admit testimony of a private citizen, obtained by listening on an
extension phone to the defendant's conversation with a third
party, would not only violate the defendant's federal right of pri-
vacy under Katz but also his constitutional rights under the search
and seizure provision of the 1889 Montana Constitution. The court
supported its interpretation that the Montana search and seizure
provision provided a right to privacy on the authority of the broad
assertions that the court had made concerning the right of privacy
in Welsh.6 Thus, the Montana Supreme Court, like Justice Bran-
deis in his dissent in Olmstead,"" recognized that the same general
concept of privacy underlay both the common law and constitu-
tional rights of privacy.6
IV. MONTANA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A. The 1972 Montana Constitution
On June 6, 1972, the people of Montana ratified a new state
Constitution. Among several provisions, either unique to Montana
or similar to provisions in only a few other states,"8 is the right of
privacy: "The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-
being of a free society and shall not be infringed without a compel-
ling state interest." 69
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., State v. Dess, 154 Mont. 231, 462 P.2d 186 (1969).
64. 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971).
65. Id. at 270, 485 P.2d at 50-51.
66. See Olmstead v. New York, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1922) ("Decency, security and lib-
erty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct
that are commands to the citizen.").
67. Brecht, 157 Mont. at 271, 485 P.2d at 51 (to refuse to apply the exclusionary rule
to evidence obtained illegally by private persons would create "a fictional distinction be-
tween classes of citizens").
68. Other provisions include a right to a clean environment, MONT. CONST. art. I1, § 3;
a broad equal rights provision, MONT. CONST. art. I, § 4; a right to know about and partici-
pate in government, MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 8, 9; and a right to economic assistance and
social and rehabilitative services, MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3. For a discussion of similar
provisions in other states, see Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among
State Courts, 33 SYRACusE L. REv. 731, 734 (1982).
69. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
[Vol. 48
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The delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention
were aware that the right of privacy had been recognized by both
the United States and Montana Supreme Courts. The Bill of
Rights Committee cited both Griswold and Brecht in its com-
ments70 and Welsh was referred to during the debates.7' Twice
during the debates, delegates explicitly acknowledged that the
Montana Supreme Court had already recognized a right of pri-
vacy.72 Further, the chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee
stated to the full convention that "[tihe committee in no way in-
tend[ed] to overturn these decisions which establish[ed] so impor-
tant a right. 73
Despite the fact that there had already been judicial recogni-
tion of the right of privacy, the delegates thought it important to
include the right in the constitution. There was no disagreement
among the delegates concerning Delegate Campbell's assessment of
the Bill of Rights Committee's "feeling . ..that the times have
changed sufficiently that this important right should now be [ex-
plicitly] recognized. '7 " Delegate Campbell attributed this change to
"an increasingly complex society ... [in which] our area of pri-
vacy has decreased, decreased, and decreased. 7 Delegate Camp-
bell further provided a helpful analogy that one might conclude
aptly characterized the sentiments of a vast majority of the
delegates:
What this would do-by requiring that this area of privacy be
protected unless there is a showing of a compelling state interest,
it produces what I call a semipermeable wall of separation be-
tween individual and state; just as the wall of separation between
church and state is absolute, the wall of separation we are propos-
ing with this section would be semipermeable. That is, as a par-
ticipating member of society, we all recognize that the state must
come into our private lives at some point; but what it says is,
don't come into our private lives unless you have good reason for
being there. We felt that this, as a mandate to our government,
would cause a complete reexamination and guarantee our individ-
ual citizens of Montana this very important right-the right to be
70. MONT. CONST. CONy., Comment to Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, Vol. II, at
632.
71. MONT. CONST. CONY., Vol. VI, at 1851.
72. Id. Vol. V, supra note 5, at 1681, Vol. VII, at 2484.
73. Id. Vol. VII, at 2484.
74. Id. Vol. V, at 1680. The interjection of "explicitly" correctly characterizes the Bill
of Rights Committee's comments: "what (the right of privacy provision) accomplishes is the
elevation of the judicially-announced right of privacy to explicit Constitutional status." Id.
Vol. II, at 632 (emphasis added).
75. Id. Vol. V, at 1681.
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let alone; and this has been called the most important right of
them all. 76
Although it is clear that the right of privacy was intended to
protect the citizen's right to be let alone, it is not as clear what
relationship the delegates intended the right of privacy to have
with the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Originally, it had been proposed that the search and
seizure provision contain an explicit reference to invasions of pri-
vacy. Concern arose, however, about the possible conflict between
the reasonableness requirement of the search and seizure provi-
sions and, as it read at that point, the absolute language of the
privacy provision.78 Noting this effect, the delegates unanimously
favored a motion striking "invasions of privacy" from the search
and seizure provision.79
Even though this action by the delegates, standing alone, sug-
gests that the search and seizure provision and the privacy provi-
sion were intended to address two different kinds of governmental
intrusion, comments by the Bill of Rights committee and other
delegates suggest that the two provisions could be applied together
in certain circumstances. The committee stated that the search
and seizure section (without the inclusion of the phrase, "invasion
of privacy") "is the procedural companion of substantive section
10 [the right of privacy provision] . . . . They [both provisions
taken together] stipulate that even after the showing of a compel-
ling state interest the state must abide by -certain procedural
guidelines."80 Thus, the search and seizure provision seems ulti-
mately to have been viewed as one aspect of the more comprehen-
sive concept of privacy.
Although the right of privacy has been most significant in
Montana case law in the context of search and seizure issues,81 the
drafters of the privacy provision intended the right to include
more than traditional search and seizure. 2 From the debates it is
76. Id.
77. Id. Vol. V, Delegate Proposal No. 14, at 98.
78. Id. Vol. V, at 1688.
79. Id.
80. Id. Vol. II, Comments to Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, at 633.
81. Ever since the passage of the new Montana Constitution the court has noted that
"[in addition to the protections accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution and the Montana Constitution, against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Mon-
tana Constitution specifically protects the individual's right to privacy." City of Helena v.
Lamping, 719 P.2d 1245 (Mont. 1986).
82. The issue also arises in the construction of the right to know provision, MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 9 which explicitly excepts from its mandate, "cases in which the demand of
individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure."
[Vol. 48
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clear that the right was intended to protect citizens from illegal
private action and from legislation and governmental practices
that interfered with their autonomy to make decisions in matters
that are generally considered private.83 It was also intended to ad-
dress what kinds of information could be gathered, as well as what
methods are appropriate to gather such information. 4
83. In the Bill of Rights Committee comments, Griswold is cited as an example of
what the right of privacy has already been held to entail. Vol. II, MONT. CONST. CONV., supra
note 5, Comments to Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, at 632. Perhaps what is most sug-
gestive of this facet of privacy is Delegate Campbell's description of the right as a "semiper-
meable wall between individual and state." See supra text accompanying note 75.
Very few cases raising this facet of privacy, however, have come before the Montana
Supreme Court. In at least one case, Yanzick v. School Dist. No. 23, 196 Mont. 375, 641 P.2d
431 (1982), an opportunity for the interpretation and application of the autonomy facet of
the right of privacy was not seized. In Yanzick, a teacher was fired at least in part because
he was living with a woman, outside of marriage. Thus, a "zone of privacy" related to prior
federally recognized zones was implied. Rather than address the privacy issue, the court
solved the case on a broader basis, holding that "conduct of a teacher including a characteri-
zation that it is immoral, must be such as to directly affect the.performance by the teacher
of his duties as a teacher." Id. at 392, 641 P.2d at 441. See also Storch v. Board of Directors,
169 Mont. 176, 545 P.2d 644 (1976) (where an employee was dismissed because of physical
appearance, bodily cleanliness, illicit cohabitation, and poor relationship with the medical
community, the court refused to address the right of privacy, holding that "when an em-
ployee's conduct affects his ability to adequately perform his duties, he can be discharged."
Id. at 184, 545 P.2d at 649). Cf. Slohodan v. U.P.S., Inc., 193 N.J. Super. 586, 475 A.2d 618
(1984) (remanded to determine whether it was violative of any right of privacy to fire em-
ployees for extramarital sex and whether improper inquiry or surveillance was used by
employer).
Similarly, privacy was mentioned in passing, but not analyzed in the context of the
termination of parental rights in In re L.F.G., 183 Mont. 239, 598 P.2d 1125 (1979). In an
earlier termination case, however, In re Guardianship of Doney, 174 Mont. 282, 570 P.2d
575 (1977), the court declared that "[t]here are ... few invasions by the state into the
privacy of the individual that are more extreme than that of depriving a natural parent of
the custody of his children." Id. at 285, 570 P.2d at 577. The court relied, however, on
federal privacy cases, particularly Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (striking down an
Illinois statutory presumption that unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents)
rather than the Montana constitutional right of privacy. Id. at 286, 570 P.2d at 577.
In the only case where the court was clearly urged to adopt vanguard interpretation of
privacy, State ex rel. Zander v. District Ct., 180 Mont. 548, 591 P.2d 656 (1979), the court
refused to strike down the criminalization of the possession of marijuana as violative of the
right of privacy. Thus, the court did not follow the high court of its sister state Alaska,
which construed its own right of privacy to permit the use of marijuana in one's own home.
Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). See also State ex rel. Zander, 181 Mont. 454,
468, 594 P.2d 273, 285 (1979) (Shea, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court should have
followed Ravin).
84. The government can only gather information in which it has a compelling state
interest. Likewise, the delegates expressed concern about the ways in which the government
gathered information in which it had a compelling interest. At least, the method must be
reasonable. See supra note 78. MONT. CONST. CONV., Vol. 5, at 1688.
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B. What Constitutes a Constitutionally Protected Interest?
1. What Does the Concept of Privacy Entail?
From a survey of the development of the concept of privacy
one comes to understand that perhaps no legal term has been used
more equivocally by the courts and commentators than the term
"privacy." It has been relied on to define and to protect many dif-
ferent and apparently unconnected activities and interests. It is
most difficult to analyze these disparate concepts of privacy in a
logical, coherent manner.
The Montana Constitution itself does not contain a principle
for determining the particular kinds of interests that are protected
by its right of privacy. The debates of the delegates at the consti-
tutional convention provide little guidance except for articulating a
concern about the growth of government and society, both in size
and complexity, and about the impact that this growth has on the
integrity of the individual.8 5 Perhaps the most important guide
comes from the delegates' express affirmation of the ways in which
the state and federal courts had begun to protect the right of
privacy.8 6
To date, in the United States and in Montana, a number of
known interests have been given protection under the classification
of privacy in regard to physical interference with one's person,
one's home, and one's things. This part of the concept of privacy is
also regularly classified and analyzed under search and seizure.
More subtle interference with one's person, including the surrepti-
tious seizure of words, is protected under the case law development
based on search and seizure theories but with more specific use of
85. Delegate Campbell put it this way:
Certainly, back in 1776, 1789, when they developed our Bill of Rights, the search
and seizure provisions were enough, when a man's home was his castle and the
state could not invade upon his home without the procuring of a search warrant
with probable cause being stated before a magistrate and a search warrant being
issued. No other protection was necessary; and this certainly was the greatest
amount of protection that any free society had given its individuals. In that type
of society, of course, the neighbor was maybe 3 to 4 miles away. There was no real
infringement upon the individual and his right of privacy. However, today we
have observed an increasingly complex society and we know that our area of pri-
vacy has decreased, decreased and decreased.
Id. Vol. V, at 1681.
86. See supra notes 70-73. MONT. CONST. CoNy., Vol. II, at 632; Vol. V, at 1681; and
Vol. VII, at 2484.
87. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Hoster v. United States, 265 U.S.
57 (1924); Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth
Amendment Protections, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 969 (1968).
[Vol. 48
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the term privacy as Coerced seizure of one's thoughts is also pro-
tected primarily under the fifth amendment analysis of self-
incrimination.8"
Respect for personal autonomy has spawned another group of
rights protected by the concept of privacy. First, there are core
rights alluded to by Brandeis and Warren and generally sustained
under tort theories that encompass the right to be let alone. These
include concepts of seclusion or solitude, private facts, and false
publicity.90 These concepts are only slight additions to or varia-
tions on ancient privacy concepts generally classified as trespass,
designed to protect one's property-including person, place and
things.9 Second, there are protected determinations about procre-
ation,92 sexual choices,93 pornography,94 family relationships,9"
child rearing, and education.9
An additional procedural dimension of privacy, at least in
Montana, is built upon the right to know.9 7 The collection, use,
and dissemination of private facts by government agencies or pri-
vate persons may infringe upon rights of privacy. For example, the
credit information gathered and sold by private credit corpora-
tions, or information gathered and disseminated by the NCIC or
by the Montana Highway department. By permitting access to this
information via the right to know provision, citizens are enabled to
police the acquisition and use of information about them. Thus, it
is an important means to protect privacy.
88. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
89. E.g., see Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). This case construes the fourteenth
amendment and speaks to due process, not the fifth amendment of self-incrimination.
90. See Prosser, supra note 16.
91. E.g., the common law torts of trespass to person, chattel, and land. See W. KEE-
TON, PROSSER & KEEroN, ON THE LAW OF TORTS 292 (1984). The right may also be violated
by a variety of criminal events such as assault, theft, or burglary. The common law privacy
actions are attempts to plug the gap between traditional trespass actions and crimes. See
Prosser, supra note 16, at 392.
92. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 497 (1965); Pie v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 997, 523
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), which did not mention a right of privacy but to which the
right might be traced insofar as it includes sexual matters.
93. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
94. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
95. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
96. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
97. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9:
No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the
deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivi-
sions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds
the merits of public disclosure.
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The delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitution explicitly re-
ferred to a number of rights of privacy in drafting the privacy pro-
vision, but deliberately drafted a general provision which protects
"individual privacy."98 Like the courts that had considered many
aspects of privacy, the delegates to the 1972 constitutional conven-
tion did not attempt to define privacy; 99 nor has the Montana Su-
preme Court since attempted any comprehensive definition of the
term.
It is constructive, however, to make at least an attempt to
sketch a single concept of privacy. Such a sketch could help put
the historical development of these rights of privacy in context, as
well as provide the conceptual means for further principled devel-
opment of these rights. Privacy (with a capital "P"), perhaps, can
best be understood by examining the political theory that was sem-
inal to the way in which the persons who drafted our original state
and federal constitutions understood (and the way in which we
generally still understand) persons and their relationships with
other persons both as individuals and together as society. This po-
litical theory was that of the English philosopher John Locke. Al-
though the central themes of Locke's theory were not original,'00
Locke's version of these themes most influenced colonial American
political theory.' 0 '
It is true that neither Locke nor the colonial Americans explic-
itly expressed their theory about the relationships between persons
(even their proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures) in terms of "privacy."' 12 Nevertheless, as one scholar on
privacy has concluded, it was "a series of assumptions-drawn
heavily from the philosophy of John Locke-that defined the con-
text for privacy in a republican political system.' 103
The prevalent concept of liberty in colonial America derived
98. The delegates added the word "individual" on the floor. MONT. CONST. CONV., Vol.
V, at 1680-81.
99. They intended for the courts to evolve and apply the principle of privacy as cir-
cumstances in society inevitably change. See MONT. CONST. CONV., Bill of Rights Committee
Comments, Vol. II, at 632; Delegate Campbell, Vol. VI, MONT. CONST. CONy., supra note 5,
at 1851. The Montana Supreme Court overruled the Katz test. See Montana Human Right
Div. v. Billings, 199 Mont. 434, 649 P.2d 1283 (1982). But the Katz test itself, relying on the
subjective expectation of the person alleging a violation of privacy and the court's determi-
nation of whether that expectation is reasonable according to prevailing societal standards,
eludes comprehensive definition.
100. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.
101. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 330.
102. In point of fact, the term privacy was not used until the late nineteenth century.
See supra notes 10-13.
103. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 330.
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from European political and legal theory was remarkably narrow,
particularly when considered in conjunction with the other two
American ideals, life and property. " As a legal right, liberty sim-
ply meant freedom of movement.'015 Whereas rights of privacy
might be considered to be species of liberty, in the sense of both
being free to do something and being free from having to do some-
thing, seventeenth and eighteenth century political theory would
not have spoken of these rights or liberty in quite this way.
For example, instead of speaking of liberty as encompassing
all other rights and their complementary duties, John Locke, in his
Second Treatise on Government, used the notion of private prop-
erty to encompass these rights and duties, and ultimately derived
liberty from that notion.'0 6 All three fundamental American ideals,
"life, liberty and estate [property in the narrow sense]," were con-
sidered by Locke to be kinds of property. 01
An examination of what Locke meant by "property" sheds
some light on what the courts, for nearly a century, have been call-
ing privacy. These two concepts are intimately related because the
foundation of Locke's entire political theory is the inherent prop-
erty that one has in his own person. For Locke, the property inter-
est one has in his own person exists logically and temporally prior
to the creation of any other property rights. Locke expressed this
priority by speaking of the rights that persons possess in "the state
of nature." In the state of nature, "[tihough the earth and all in-
ferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a prop-
erty in his own person; this nobody has any right to but him-
self."' 08 Other property rights come into being as persons mingle
what is truly their own, their ideas and labor, with what is initially
the property of no one. 09 Thus, these subsidiary property rights
that persons have in things or land arise through the process of
making them personal and private." 0
Because property (life, liberty and estate) is the basis for all
moral and legal rights, the protection of property is both the pur-
pose for civil and political society and the standard for evaluating
104. Otherwise expressed as the pursuit of happiness.
105. This process is also how land rights developed in the western United States
through homesteading and the staking of mining claims. See generally The Homestead Act
of 1862, 43 U.S.C. § 161 (repealed 1976), and The Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-39.
106. See J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 87 (Thomas P. Reardon ed.
1952) (1st ed. London 1690).
107. Id.
108. Id. at § 27.
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both the legitimacy of its creation and the process by which it car-
ries out its purpose. 1 ' But because property is merely an expres-
sion of the interest each person has in himself, simply by virtue of
his personal sense of being, all government derives from self-gov-
ernment. Thus, the crucial feature of Locke's theory is that politi-
cal or civil society may only be formed by the consent of all who
would be subject to its jurisdiction." 2 Further, even though society
functions by "the will and determination of the majority"' 3 once
persons have consented, there are limitations upon government:
the majority cannot legislate "farther than the common good, but
is obliged to secure every one's property"" 4 and cannot otherwise
act arbitrarily." 5
Because Locke's notion of "property" rests on a right that one
has to his own person, we might justifiably characterize Locke's
state of nature as a state of individual privacy rather than prop-
erty. That this interest of a person in his own person constitutes a
more basic concept of privacy is demonstrated in two ways. First,
the very etymological meaning of the term privacy aptly character-
izes Locke's conception of persons. Privacy, like privation, privy,
etc., comes from the latin word, "privus," which has two meanings.
Privus means "single" or "each" and "particular," "special," or
"one's own.""' 6 Both aspects of the concept, particularly the sense
of "one's own," aptly describe Locke's property notions. Persons
are inherently individuals and no one else has a right to control
their person or their other property without their consent. Second,
to identify the concept of privacy with Locke's notion of property
is consistent with the historical development of various rights of
privacy, both in the common law and in constitutional law, which
have utilized property analyses. For example, all of the common
law tort actions for invasion of privacy involve a kind of trespass or
appropriation. 117 Likewise, until Katz, fourth amendment analyses
of unreasonable searches and seizures utilized notions of tres-
pass." 8 Even after Katz, property concepts are still used by the
Court to flesh out the boundaries of the fourth amendment." 9
111. Id. at §§ 87, 94, 95.
112. Id. at §§95 & 96.
113. Id.
114. Id. at § 131.
115. Id. at § 142.
116. CASSELL'S NEW LATIN DICTIONARY (1959).
117. See supra notes 16 & 17.
118. See, e.g., Olmstead v. New York, 277 U.S. 438 (1922); Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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The conclusion to be drawn is that the aim of all law is the
protection of persons' privacy, which includes their persons, places
and things. Our society has done this by protecting a person
against trespasses both upon his body 12 0 and upon his tangible
property. 121 In addition, civil and criminal laws and constitutional
provisions have protected other less tangible facets of our person
or property. Such facets have included likenesses of persons, 22
freedom of expression 23 and conscience,'124 emotional tranquility,
and ultimately personal choices that do not seriously threaten
harm to the privacy of others.125
Ultimately, what is the meaning of "privacy"? In the broadest
context possible it is the right "to be let alone" by other persons,
as well as by the government. From the preceding analysis, it fol-
lows that the legal protection of "privacy" encompasses the sub-
stantive concepts of both "tort" and "crime." The law provides
sanctions to discourage others from intruding on you and yours
and compensation when they have done so. It also encompasses
substantive protection from governmental intrusions; for example,
no taking without compensation, absolute freedom of conscience,
freedom to choose as to intimate personal matters, and freedom
from self-incrimination. Likewise, it encompasses aspects of proce-
dural due process. Even when there is a legitimate basis for the
government to invade a person's privacy, there must be procedural
standards for such invasions; for example, the need to show proba-
ble cause to support searches, seizures and electronic surveillance.
Although it would not be appropriate to abandon traditional
civil, criminal and constitutional terms, like assault, negligence and
self incrimination; the recognition that all legal rights spring from
a single, broad concept of "privacy" is important. It is important
because it explains how the "sense of privacy" and what the courts
have sometimes called "privacy" in common law, statutory and
constitutional contexts relates to other legal rights and duties. Fur-
ther, it justifies how the courts have used "privacy" (and hopefully
will continue to do so in a principled manner) to remedy invasions
and harms initiated or caused by private persons, corporations and
government that do not fit the traditional causes of action, crimes
or constitutional protections.
120. See supra note 91.
121. Id.
122. See supra note 17.
123. U.S. CONST. amend I.
124. Id.
125. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, ON TORTS 849, § 117 (4th ed. 1984).
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Perhaps this expansive notion of privacy can provide a basis
for that "complete reexamination" of the relationship between per-
sons as individuals and persons as government that the delegates
to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention sought.126 As such,
it can serve as a criterion both for evaluating how the Montana
Supreme Court has construed the constitutional right of privacy
and for suggesting how the right ought to be further developed.
2. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
As noted above, the United States Supreme Court has devel-
oped separate and somewhat distinct approaches in analyzing con-
stitutional privacy interests. In the area of personal autonomy, the
court has recognized that certain "zones of privacy" may be pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment. 12 7 By contrast, in analyzing
unreasonable searches and seizures the Court has relied on the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test, 28 more recently ex-
pressed as the "legitimate expectation of privacy" test.2 9
In light of pre-1972 standards for determining privacy inter-
ests which the Montana Supreme Court was compelled to apply in
appeals grounded on the fourteenth amendment, it is understanda-
ble why, after the ratification of the 1972 Montana Constitution,
the court usually has applied the federal "reasonable expectation
of privacy" test to determine whether a particular interest was pro-
tected by Montana's right of privacy. Occasionally the Montana
Supreme Court has referred to the existence of some ephemeral
"Montana right of privacy" to justify deviating from the federal
standard. 30
It further appears that the Montana Supreme Court has
adopted the Katz test as the primary if not the sole method of
interpreting the Montana privacy provision. In 1982, in Montana
Human Rights Division v. City of Billings,' the court stated that
the standard for determining whether a person's constitutionally
126. MONT. CONST. CONy., Vol. V, at 1681.
127. See supra notes 91-96.
128. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also
Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
129. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) ("[The Katz Court] held that
capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property
right in the invaded plea but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the
Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." The Katz major-
ity opinion, however, protected the petitioner's "privacy upon which he justifiably relied
."); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
130. See, e.g., State v. Hyem, - Mont. ., 630 P.2d 202 (1981).
131. 199 Mont. 434, 649 P.2d 1283 (1982).
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protected privacy interest has been violated "is whether the party
involved subjectively expected the information to be and remain
private, and whether society is willing to recognize that expecta-
tion as reasonable."132 The Montana Human Rights case is signifi-
cant because it applied the Katz test even though it did not in-
volve a search and seizure in a criminal investigation. Rather, it
involved the city's refusal to turn over personnel files and test
scores pursuant to an investigation of alleged discrimination. Fur-
ther, the city of Billings did not assert that the procedure for ob-
taining these materials was unreasonable but that the materials
themselves were protected by the right of privacy.
That the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is to
be applied even in civil cases was made evident in Missoulian v.
Board of Regents33 decided in 1984. In Missoulian, the Montana
Supreme Court was required to construe the individual privacy ex-
ception to the right to know provision of the Montana Constitu-
tion." The Court held that to determine whether there is a pri-
vacy interest that clearly exceeds the public's right to know, the
person whose privacy interest is being asserted must have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. 5
Montana is not unique in using the Katz test to construe con-
stitutional privacy interests. The "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" test is supported by strong federal precedent' as well as
decisions in other states.137 Even Alaska, which has a separate con-
stitutional privacy provision has relied on the test. 138 Further, its
use in construing the Montana right of privacy is supported indi-
rectly by the fact that the constitutional convention delegates, who
must have known of the Katz decision, neither criticized it nor
proposed alternatives to it. Unfortunately, the Katz test like its
predecessor, the trespass doctrine, is not adequate to construe the
Montana Constitution's right of privacy.
The Katz test is a federal standard created to define the rea-
sonableness of a search or seizure as demanded by the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Although the dele-
132. Id. at 442, 649 P.2d at 1287.
133. - Mont. -, 675 P.2d 962 (1984).
134. For the text of this provision, see supra note 97.
135. Missoulian, - Mont. at - , 675 P.2d at 967.
136. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); United States v. United States
Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297.
137. People v. Edwards, 90 Cal. Rptr. 633, 458 P.2d 713 (1969); Croker v. State, 477
P.2d 122 (Wyo. 1970).
138. See City and Borough of Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1984); Ravin v.
State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
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gates to the Montana Constitutional Convention approved of the
advances made by the Warren Court in protecting the right of pri-
vacy, ' they still elected to have an express Montana constitu-
tional provision. This at least suggests an intent that Montana
should have its own high standard of protection against violations
of privacy and that Montana should not simply constitutionalize
the level of privacy protection provided by the federal courts.
Delegate Campbell put it this way:
We had much discussion before our committee, and why not
try to define the right, to put in specific examples. But it was our
feeling that once you do that, you are running a risk that you may
eliminate other areas in the future which may be developed by
the court.'40
Apparently, the delegates did not want to "fix" the concept of pri-
vacy but allow it to expand.
To rely on a federal test defeats the purpose of including a
state constitutional provision expressly protecting individual pri-
vacy. To follow federal decisions or the decisions of sister states
that have no express and independent right of privacy forecloses
the opportunity to develop a "Montana right of privacy." In the
recent decision State v. Long, the Montana court obviously fol-
lowed federal precedent. 14 1 It is arguable that the court also fol-
lowed federal precedent in Hastetter v. Behan,142 where it relied
on "persuasive federal authority" to hold that a person had no "le-
gitimate expectation of privacy in the mere fact that a telephone
call was made to a particular number.' 43
Even the use of the Katz test does not require an interpreta-
tion of the test identical with the United States Supreme Court.
For example, other state courts using the Katz test have rejected
the United States Supreme Court's conclusion that the use of pen
registers to record the number to which a phone call was made did
not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.14 4 Likewise, other
state courts have held that a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his bank records."15
There is the chance that the use of a federal test to construe a
139. See supra notes 70-72.
140. MONT. CONST. CONY., Vol. VI, at 1851.
141. __ Mont. at -, 700 P.2d at 157.
142. 196 Mont. 280, 639 P.2d 510 (1982).
143. Id. at __, 639 P.2d at 512 (author notes that eight paragraphs of the decision
were inadvertently omitted from the Montana Reports.)
144. See state court cases cited supra note 53.
145. See state court cases cited supra note 53.
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state constitutional provision may permit the United States Su-
preme Court to review the decision based on a conclusion that the
state court did not rest its decision on an independent and ade-
quate state ground.1" 6 State courts are permitted to utilize federal
cases as persuasive authority in construing their own constitu-
tions.'117 However, the Burger Court has emphasized that the state
courts who do so may suffer reversal if they inaccurately interpret
the federal decisions. Additionally, to avoid the threat of reversal,
state courts must clearly state they do not feel compelled by those
federal decisions in construing their own constitutions and must
clearly specify independent and adequate state grounds to support
their decisions. 4" Therefore, whenever a claim of privacy is made
pursuant to both federal and state constitutions, and the Katz
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test is mentioned, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court opinion should at least include a plain state-
ment that the Katz test is mentioned as a helpful but not a con-
trolling guide for construing the Montana Constitution. 49
Not only is the use of the Katz test suspect because of con-
cerns about federalism, the test itself has been the subject of criti-
cism by courts and commentators. First, the Katz test overempha-
sizes a person's subjective expectation of privacy. Second, the
abandonment of the trespass doctrine in favor of the Katz test has
led to the withdrawal of some of the protection of tangible prop-
erty, formerly afforded in fourth amendment search and seizure
cases.
Justice Harlan, who authored the two-part test, later ex-
pressed his misgivings about it in a dissenting opinion. 50 He
warned that in doing the analysis the person's actual expectations
should not be overly emphasized because they "are in large part
reflections" of what is the status quo rather than setting a stan-
dard for what ought to be protected. 15 One commentator, in an
analysis of the development of California's right of privacy, has
made similar criticisms. He states that in the Katz analysis "[t]he
substance of privacy is ignored in favor of a consideration of the
146. For a general discussion of the doctrine of independent and adequate state
grounds, see Elison & NettikSimmons, Federalism and State Constitutions: The New Doc-
trine of Independent and Adequate State Grounds, 45 MoNT. L. REv. 177 (1984).
147. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1041 ("If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it
would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain
statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the
purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached.").
150. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 768 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 786.
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pain occasioned by disappointment.' 151 He applauds the approach
the California Supreme Court took in one case, where it seemed to
focus on the intrusiveness of the governmental activity rather than
on the disappointed expectations of the individual. 153
Further, Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Katz,
carefully noted that this test was not inconsistent with but rather
enveloped the prior analyses that were based on notions of prop-
erty.1 54 The catchy phrase that the constitution protects people not
places is simply erroneous. Obviously, the Constitution protects
both people and places. In light of the philosophical analysis
above, one would argue that protection is given to places only inso-
far as they are the property of people and thereby conclude that
the less catchy but more accurate phrase should be that the consti-
tution protects people and people's property. 55 The Burger Court
has used the reasonableness, or justifiable, prong of the Katz test
to withdraw protection from interests that would have been pro-
tected under property-based analysis. This subtle shift is indicated
in the Court's increasing use of the term "legitimate" for the ear-
lier term "reasonable.' 15 For example, persons no longer have au-
tomatic standing to assert a fourth amendment violation in posses-
sory crimes. 157 Likewise, persons' privacy interests in tangible
property, particularly automobiles, has been diminished. 58
Some state courts have continued to consider property notions
in addition to the Katz test. For example, in State v. Jones,5 9 a
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, held that an of-
ficer's search of the defendant's automobile for evidence of the
ownership without providing the defendant the opportunity to pro-
duce such evidence constituted a violation of his "constitutional
152. Gerstein, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development of the
Protection of Private Life, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385, 389 (1982).
153. Id. at 402-04 (citing White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr.
94 (1975)).
154. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-62.
155. To be both complete and accurate the statement should include persons, and
property belonging to persons, including both real property (particularly but not exclusively
one's home) and personal property.
156. See supra note 129.
157. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
158. See e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (monitoring beeper placed
inside a 5 gal. drum of chloroform purchased by defendant. . . did not constitute a fourth
amendment search); New York v. Belting, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (not only may police search
the passenger compartment of car, incident to lawful arrest, but may also examine contents
of any containers found in passenger compartment); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640
(1983) (permitting inventory of defendant's shoulder bag, defendant having been arrested
for disturbing the peace).
159. 195 N.J. Super. 119, 478 A.2d 424 (1984).
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right to privacy in his vehicle and personal effects." 160
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on the other hand, simply
rejected the federal test in Commonwealth v. Sell:"6'
We decline to undermine the clear language of [our constitutional
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures] . . . by
making the Fourth Amendment's amorphous "legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy" standard a part of our state guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . . We believe the United
States Supreme Court's current use of the "legitimate expectation
of privacy" concept needlessly detracts from the critical element
of unreasonable governmental intrusion. . .. [O]wnership or pos-
session of the seized property is adequate to entitle the owner or
possessor thereof to invoke the constitutional protection .... 111
If the Montana court continues to rely on the Katz test and its
federal interpretation, the Montana right of privacy will not always
be given the significance and careful construction that it deserves.
Of course, where it is the privacy of a dwelling that is invaded, the
Montana court, like the United States Supreme Court, has been
extremely protective. In a case involving the property interest of a
defendant in his home, the Montana court found that as "the situs
of protected private activities . . the constitution extends special
safeguards to the privacy of the home.' 163
In at least one case since the adoption of the right of privacy,
however, the Montana Supreme Court reached a conclusion relying
on the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis that could prove
to be less protective than an analysis based on a possessory inter-
est. In State v. Dess,'64 the court held that because a camper had a
diminished expectation of privacy in his campsite on public land
next to a public road, he had no standing to assert a fourth amend-
ment claim against the seizure of items found in that campsite.
The court quoted with approval the Supreme Court's statement in
Salvucci that the question should be "whether he had an expecta-
tion of privacy in the area searched.' 1 65
160. Id. at 124, 478 A.2d at 427.
161. 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d 457 (1983).
162. Id. at -, 470 A.2d at 468-69.
163. State v. Carlson, 198 Mont. 113, 126, 644 P.2d 498, 505 (1982) (holding full custo-
dial arrest improper on warrant for traffic misdemeanor and entry into defendant's home
incident to such arrest was unlawful). Cf. State v. Wood, - Mont. __, 666 P.2d 753
(1983) (right of individual privacy must yield to compelling state interests allowing full cus-
todial arrests; searches pursuant to felony warrants.).
164. 201 Mont. 456, 655 P.2d 149 (1982).
165. Id. at 463, 655 P.2d at 153 (quoting United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92-93
(1980)). The court also relied on a second theory, that the officer had probable cause to seize
the items found in the campsite.
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The Katz test has in other instances provided a greater area of
protected privacy interest than a property-based analysis. For ex-
ample, in State v. Isom,'6a the Montana Supreme Court held that a
nephew had standing to contest the legality of a search of his un-
cle's home. The court stated that "protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures does not depend upon a property right in the
invaded place, but rather upon whether the area was one in which
there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental
intrusion. ' 167 Of course, this result could have been reached using
a property-based analysis by permitting the nephew to assert the
privacy interests of his uncle. Such an analysis would have been
consistent with an approach that focuses on the degree of intrusion
by the government rather than the harm to the petitioner. 6 '
The two tests need not be mutually exclusive. The Katz no-
tion of protected persons, as Justice Harlan noted, should fully
contain within its protection those places protected through the
notion of property. One might utilize both tests in the following
manner. First, the court should ask whether the area to be
searched or the object to be seized is owned or possessed by the
party. If so, there ought to be a presumption of a legitimate or
reasonable expectation of privacy in that property. Second, if there
is no interest that society would call ownership or possession, then
the Katz test should be applied. To be adequate the Katz test
should be twofold. First, the subjective aspect of the test would be
considered: did the defendant have an actual expectation of pri-
vacy which Montana is willing to consider worthy of protection?
Second, if the defendant had no subjective expectation, because
his expectations have been restricted by the status quo, the court
ought to consider the intrusiveness of the government's activity
and determine whether it was excessive. Such a twofold applica-
tion of the Katz test would best protect evolving privacy interests.
Even if the Montana Supreme Court continues to use the
Katz test, it should independently apply it. It should consider
what expectations are reasonable not simply according to federal
authorities or the authority of states that are culturally, politically,
and geographically different from Montana, but by considering
166. 196 Mont. 330, 641 P.2d 417 (1982).
167. Id. at 336, 641 P.2d at 420.
168. Montana courts have consistently refused to permit standing to vicariously assert
the infringement of third person's constitutional right. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-103
(1985). This standing provision is couched in terms of whether a search is illegal as to a
particular person rather than whether a particular person is entitled to challenge the search;
see State v. Allen, - Mont. , 612 P.2d 119 (1980); State v. Kao, Mont. -, 697
P.2d 903 (1985); In re Gilliam, - Mont. __, 707 P.2d 1100 (1985).
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Montana's unique political, cultural, and legal heritage.
The Montana Supreme Court has begun to demonstrate a
willingness to make independent use of the reasonable expectation
of privacy test. For example, one way in which it has done so is to
give some weight to the expectations of privacy of persons other
than the defendant in considering whether the invasiveness of a
search or seizure requires a warrant. In State v. Fogarty,16 9 the
court, speaking in terms of the Katz test, stated that although a
probationer's status carried with it a reduced expectation of pri-
vacy, unlimited warrantless searches and seizures could not be a
condition of probation. The court further held that law enforce-
ment must have probable cause and comply with the warrant re-
quirements and that only the probation officer is permitted to
meet the lower standard of having articulable reasons to believe
that the probationer's conditions of probation have been vio-
lated.170 One of the significant reasons for the court's decision was
that the needs of society had to be balanced against not only the
rights of the probationer but also the rights of his family and
friends. 7 ' This consideration certainly departs from the subjective
aspect of the Katz test and, instead, examines the intrusiveness of
the government's actions.
Likewise, the Montana Supreme Court has in some instances
recognized that an expectation of privacy may be reasonable for
Montana though unreasonable elsewhere. For example, in State v.
Brackman, 2 the court reached a different conclusion than the
United States Supreme Court had reached in a similar case and
held that a warrantless recording of the conversation of two par-
ties, even with the consent of one of them, violated the Montana
right of privacy.17 3 More recently, in State v. Solis,'71 the court
held that a person had a reasonable expectation that his private
meeting with another person was not being videotaped by the
government.175
The Montana Supreme Court has boldly announced that it
will not "march lock step with the United States Supreme Court
169. 187 Mont. 393, 610 P.2d 140 (1980).
170. Id. at 414-16, 610 P.2d at 152-53.
171. Id.
172. 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978); Cf. White, 401 U.S. 745.
173. 178 Mont. at 117, 582 P.2d at 1222. But see State v. Hanley, 186 Mont. 410, 420,
608 P.2d 104, 110 (1980) (Montana Supreme Court claims that Brackman was consistent
with White. Brackman, however, explicitly followed Justice Harlan's dissent in White.
Brackman, 178 Mont. at 115, 582 P.2d at 1221).
174. - Mont. -, 693 P.2d 518 (1984).
175. Id. at __ , 693 P.2d at 522.
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where constitutional issues are concerned, even if applicable Mon-
tana Constitutional provisions are identical or nearly identical to
those of the Federal Constitution. o t7 The court used similarly
strong language in Butte Community Union v. Lewis' 77 stating
that the "court need not blindly follow the United States Supreme
Court when deciding whether a Montana statute is constitutional
pursuant to the Montana Constitution."
The court should continue to independently determine what is
reasonable in Montana while remaining cognizant of authority
from other jurisdictions. For example, an expectation of privacy in
certain open fields 17 8 might be reasonable because in Montana, like
agricultural Georgia, the "use of fences and barricades has always
played an important part in defining landowners' right to
privacy. 1' 79
C. Whose Privacy Interest Is Protected?
1. Who Has Standing to Invoke the Right?
The reasonable (or legitimate) expectation of privacy test has
also been used in determining whether a person had standing to
contest a questionable search or seizure. Standing thus addresses a
second question: whose privacy interest is protected? The question
of standing in the context of federal search and seizure or invasion
of privacy claims has two parts. First, there is the general federal
constitutional requirement "that the party seeking relief have an
adversary interest in the 'outcome of the controversy.' "1 0 Second,
the person having the adversary interest must show that his consti-
tutional rights have been violated, since "fourth amendment rights
are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.""'
Traditionally, the question about whether a person had stand-
ing to seek relief was analyzed separately from the question about
whether a constitutional right had been violated. 82 The federal law
176. State v. Johnson, Mont. -, -, 719 P.2d 1248, 1254 (1986).
177. - Mont. . . 712 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1986).
178. Montana has applied the "open field" exception to the warrant requirement. See
State v. Bennett, - Mont. -, 666 P.2d 747 (1983) (use of spotting scope by Sheriff to
spot marijuana growing in defendant's garden); State v. Charvat, 175 Mont. 267, 573 P.2d
660 (1978) (marijuana plants left in open field on defendant's ranch were not in an area
where any expectation of privacy exists).
179. Lo Giudice v. State, 251 Ga. 711, 719, 309 S.E.2d 355, 360 (1983) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
180. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
181. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
182. See e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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since Rakas v. Illinois,183 however, has placed the issue of a per-
son's standing to assert his fourth amendment right of privacy
within the Katz analysis itself-i.e., whether that person had a rea-
sonable or legitimate expectation of privacy. The United States
Supreme Court in Rakas merged the question of standing to con-
test the admission of evidence resulting from an illegal search and
seizure into the general fourth amendment analysis, stating that
the question is "whether the disputed search and seizure has in-
fringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment
was designed to protect." ' Although it might make sense to
merge standing into a general analysis of whether the defendant's
fourth amendment rights were violated, this has had the effect of
making the showing of standing more difficult.1 85
Unlike the United States Constitution, at least one state con-
stitution expressly provides for standing.18 6 The Montana Consti-
tution's privacy and search and seizure provisions do not.18 7 Never-
theless, the Montana Supreme Court has developed standing rules
for the assertion of constitutional claims.188 Although, in search
and seizure claims, it has often relied on federal rules,"8 it is un-
clear whether the Montana Supreme Court will follow the United
States Supreme Court's lead in making the showing of standing
more difficult. Clearly, the court is free to establish its own rules
concerning standing to assert the violation of the Montana Consti-
tution's right of privacy. 190
The Montana Supreme Court has at least implicitly addressed
the issue of standing in conjunction with the right of privacy in
two cases. In Fogarty the court stressed that the right of privacy of
a probationer's family and friends was at stake in the use of proba-
tion conditioned on nonconsensual, warrantless searches by the
probation officer or any other law enforcement official.' 9' Fogarty
suggests that the privacy interests of others do play some role in
determining what constitutes a reasonable search or seizure, as
183. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
184. Id. at 140.
185. Id.
186. See supra LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("Any person adversely affected by a search or
seizure conducted in violation of this section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the
appropriate court.").
187. But see supra, note 168, MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-103 (1985).
188. Supra note 168. See also Dess, 154 Mont. 231, 462 P.2d 186 (following Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)).
189. Id.
190. See Elison & NettickSimmons, supra note 146.
191. 187 Mont. at 414, 610 P.2d at 152.
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against the principal claimant. 192
It appears that under some circumstances the privacy interests
of third parties can be asserted.193 In Montana Human Rights Di-
vision, the court permitted the city of Billings, in seeking to pre-
vent the Division from obtaining its personnel files, to assert the
privacy rights of its employees. 9 4 It did so because the city might
have been liable to its employees for disclosing the information.
In the case of Belth v. Bennett, a case now on appeal to the
Montana Supreme Court, District Court Judge Gordon Bennett
held in favor of the public's right to know and denied the state
auditor (Andrea Bennett) the right to assert any claimed right of
privacy. e5 The memorandum opinion by Judge Bennett does not
specifically prohibit the government agency from vicariously as-
serting an individual's right of privacy. That issue was not directly
before the court. Nonetheless Judge Bennett's suggested procedure
for vindication of rights protected by the Montana constitutional
right of privacy and right to know includes notice to the individual
who might claim a right of privacy in records held by a state
agency. Presumptively the agency holding the records, acting in a
fiduciary capacity, would be required to both notify the privacy
claimant and to protect the records in the interim. The agency
would have to be granted standing to assert vicariously the privacy
right of the third person simply as an incident of the fiduciary re-
sponsibility or on some theory of potential liability to the primary
claimant as in the Montana Human Rights Division case. 96
2. Corporate Rights of Privacy: Persons vs. Individuals
Under federal and state law, a corporation is a fictional "per-
son" and thereby enjoys a different panoply of legal rights, than a
natural person. 97 In the debates of the 1972 Montana Constitu-
192. The peculiar aspect of this case is a court ordered diminished right of privacy
before the fact of any actual or potential infringement. The order diminished privacy, by
necessity, affects more than the probationer.
193. 199 Mont. 434, 649 P.2d 1283 (1982).
194. Id. at 443, 649 P.2d at 1288.
195. Belth v. Bennett, No. BDV 85733, Memorandum Re: Petitioner's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Lewis and Clark County District Court.
196. Since Judge Bennett determined that the potential third party claimant was a
corporation and that corporations are not afforded any right of privacy under the Montana
Constitution he was not forced to reach the ultimate issue as to agency standing in regard to
a legitimate third party claim of privacy.
197. H. HENN, LAWS OF CORPORATION, in Hornbook series 144, 78 (1983). Corpora-
tions are persons for the purpose of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Con-
stitution except for the prohibition against self-incrimination. See Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pac. Ry., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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tional Convention the delegates recognized this difference and
seemed less concerned about protecting any corporate right of pri-
vacy. This intent is evidenced by use of the word "individual"
rather than "person." Although corporations are "persons" for pur-
poses of most laws,' 98 they are obviously collectives and not
"individuals."
This inference from the language of the privacy provision is
supported by the comments of delegates during the debates. In
discussing the term, "individual," in the context of the privacy ex-
ception to the right to know, Delegate Dahood, the chairman of the
Bill of Rights committee, stated that although "a person can, of
course, . . . be defined to include a corporation under the law[,]
• . . [an individual . . . would not be a corporation . . . ."I" In
discussion concerning the right of privacy provision, the question
again arose concerning the privacy of corporations. Delegate
Campbell, speaking for the Bill of Rights Committee, stated: "We
do not feel that a corporation is an individual. It can be considered
a person, but not an individual. 00
Despite this clear intent of the delegates, the Montana Su-
preme Court in Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v.
Department of Public Service Regulation2"' sub silentio held that
corporations are protected by the Montana constitutional privacy
provision. Mountain States involved the utility's claim that it did
not have to provide certain materials containing trade secrets to
the Public Service Commission, whose proceedings are subject to
the Montana Constitution's right to know provision.02 In analyz-
ing the right to know provision, the court stated that "the de-
mands of individual privacy of a corporation as well as of a person
might clearly exceed the merits of public disclosure . ". . .,o This
was clearly an erroneous interpretation of the language of the con-
stitution and the intent of the drafters.
More significantly, this interpretation seemed to precipitate a
faulty analysis of the problem. In the case of most corporations,
the public right to know has no relevance. The constitutional pro-
vision says, "No person shall be deprived of the right to examine
documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or
198. Corporations are persons for the purpose of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
of the U.S. Constitution except for the prohibition against self-incrimination.
199. MONT. CONST. CONV., Vol. V, at 1680.
200. Id. at 1681.
201. - Mont. -, 634 P.2d 181 (1981).
202. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 184.
203. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 188.
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agencies of state government and its subdivisions .... 24 The
provision does not give the citizenry any right to examine docu-
ments of corporations, or the documents or dealings of their fellow
citizens.
Why then the problem? Because public utilities are not typical
corporations. They are state regulated monopolistic enterprises.
They are given special support by government and they are spe-
cially controlled by government. In the process of that control,
government as agent of the people is authorized to examine certain
records. In order to make a reasonable rate determination the Pub-
lic Service Commission is obligated to gather the facts. This is pre-
cisely the kind of public agency deliberation the constitutional pro-
vision intended to allow the citizenry to observe. Too often,
commissions formed to regulate industries such as utilities have
become subservient to the industry. Thus, the necessity for public
observations is obvious.
The intent of the Montana Constitution is equally obvious.
Granted, the court faced a complex collision of not only state
rights but also federal rights, since the utility had also claimed that
the disclosure of its trade secrets by the Public Service Commis-
sion would constitute a taking of property without due process in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. 0 5 But in answer to these
contentions, the court had available relatively clear legal answers.
First, full procedural due process was in fact afforded the corpora-
tion, or if not, it could have been remanded for that purpose. Sec-
ond, there was no taking by the state and only a prospective possi-
bility of a taking by some third party. And finally, if the court had
concluded from a careful review of the facts that a taking would
occur if the trade secrets were disclosed, it could have required the
state to post a bond or make restitution for any financial loss that
ultimately could be proved to have been sustained by the utility
corporation. The corporate claim of privacy, however, was inappro-
priate and should have been summarily dismissed.
To be sure, the public's right to know may occasionally con-
flict with the "individual's" right to privacy and the court will be
forced to reach an accommodation. The delegates to the constitu-
tional convention recognized this problem. Neither the right to
know nor the right of privacy is absolute. Recognizing that the gov-
ernment qua government has no right of privacy,20 6 but that gov-
204. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9.
205. - Mont. at -, 634 P.2d at 183.
206. Government proceedings must be open to public participation, MONT. CONST. art.
II, § 8, and subject to public scrutiny, MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9. The only exception is where
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ernment is made up of individuals who have a right of privacy, the
delegates made the right to know provision subject to the require-
ment that individual privacy be protected20 7 Likewise, the dele-
gates realized that the barrier between individuals and government
must be "semi-permeable. '208 The semi-permeability of the barrier
means that a member of society may be required to disclose his
private affairs to the extent that they materially affect the affairs
of others.20
This principle explains why some corporations are regulated
by the state; their activities greatly affect the lives of the other
citizens of Montana. Consequently, their privacy interests should
be proportionately diminished if, in fact, they have any legitimate
claim to privacy. Likewise, government officials, whose acts cer-
tainly affect others, have reduced expectations of privacy. It is in-
conceivable, however, that there would ever be a legitimate basis
for the complete elimination of the privacy of an individual as a
participant in a corporation or as an agent of government. To do so
would be to deny their individuality.210
D. Against Whose Invasions Does the Right of Privacy
Protect?
Justice Morrison, speaking for the majority, has adamantly
stated in State v. Long 1 that constitutions are limitations on the
"individual" privacy is threatened, not governmental privacy. See MONT. CONST. CONY., Vol.
V, at 1670 per Delegate Eck, "The committee intended by this provision that the delibera-
tion and resolution of all public matters must be subject to public scrutiny." Id. (emphasis
added). It is urged that this is especially the case in a democratic society wherein the resolu-
tion of increasingly complex questions lead to the establishment of a complex bureaucratic
system of administrative agencies.
207. MONT. CONST. CONV., Vol. V, at 1670 ("We were aware of this, really, from the
beginning in our committee deliberations the fact that there is a right to privacy involved in
the right to know."); Id. at 1673 ("There has got to be a limit to it [i.e., access to govern-
ment discounts]. The reason we organize in a free society is to make sure we have dignity,
...that our private affairs are not open to public scrutiny.").
208. See supra text accompanying note 76.
209. E.g., crimes, communicable disease, and concealed assets. Thus, individual pri-
vacy is not an absolute trump. It is possible that the privacy interest does not clearly exceed
the merits of public disclosure. See MONT. CONST. CONV., Vol. V, at 1671, per Delegate Eck,
(continuing public scrutiny of ordinary personnel matters to the dismissal of an agency
head, the latter situation requiring that "the public has a right to know the reason of
dismissal").
210. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 would require a compelling state interest to invade an
individual's right of privacy. A valid state interest in the complete elimination of privacy is
difficult to imagine. Certainly, any statutory attempt to pursue a valid and compelling state
interest that resulted in excessive infringement of individual privacy would be vague, over
broad, or not reasonably related to the interest invoked.
211. State v. Long, - Mont. - , 700 P.2d 153 (1985).
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exercise of the powers of government, not citizens. From this pre-
mise, it follows that only invasions of privacy by state officials are
protected by the constitutional privacy provision. This is the posi-
tion of the federal courts concerning the federal Bill of Rights, in-
cluding the search and seizure provision.212 Likewise, it is the posi-
tion of nearly all of the state courts who have considered the
question.21 3
Although the notion that a constitution's sole purpose is to
limit the powers of the institutions of government may be appro-
priate to the federal Constitution, it is not necessarily an appropri-
ate understanding of state constitutions. A state constitution
should not only limit the institutions of government -i.e., the peo-
ple in their collective capacity-but should also authorize and, in
some instances require, that these institutions limit the people in
their individual capacities. That the Montana Constitution per-
forms a very different function from the federal Constitution is
made evident by a consideration of the 1972 Montana Constitu-
tional proceedings and prior Montana case law, as well as by gen-
eral considerations of state constitutional theory.
The Montana Constitution's right of privacy provision neither
limits itself to state action (as does the fourteenth amendment to
the federal Constitution)21 4 nor explicitly states that it applies to
actions by citizens, as does the Montana right to dignity provi-
sion.2" 5 Although the delegates primarily considered the privacy
provision to protect against governmental intrusions, there is evi-
denCe that they were concerned about invasions of privacy by pri-
vate citizens. Delegate Campbell approvingly read a newspaper ed-
212. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). See infra notes 310 & 311.
213. See, e.g., People v. Brewer, 690 P.2d 860 (Colo. 1984); Gajdos v. State, 462 N.E.2d
1017 (Ind. 1984); State v. Von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I. 1984). But see People v. Zelinski,
24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1979) (searches by private security guard
subject to right of privacy); Allen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 409 So. 2d 1268, 1274 (La. 1982)
("We think ... that Article 1, Section 5 prohibits unreasonable searches by anyone,
whether private persons or police"); State v. Clauk, 454 So. 2d 232 (La. Ct. App. 1984)
(refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to the evidence obtained by an unreasonable private
search); Settle v. State, 679 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (unlawful stop by officer out of
his jurisdiction with no probable cause for a citizen's arrest subjected to exclusionary rule
for violation of citizen's arrest statute).
214. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall . ..deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law .... " (emphasis added)). In Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) the Court stated that the federal exclusionary rule was
"a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and ...not . . . a limitation upon
other than governmental agencies." The Burdeau Court's conclusion, however, was based on
a historical investigation of the framers' intent concerning the fourth amendment.
215. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation or
institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights
... ..,1.
34




It isn't only a careless government that has this power to pry;
political organizations, private information gathering firms, and
even an individual can now snoop more easily and more effec-
tively than ever before. We certainly hope that such snooping is
not as widespread as some persons would have us to believe, but
with technology easily available and becoming more refined all
the time, prudent safeguards against the misuse of such technol-
ogy are needed. Some may urge and argue that this is a legisla-
tive, not a constitutional issue. We think the right of privacy is
like a number of other inalienable rights; a carefully worded con-
stitutional article affirming this right is desirable.216
More importantly, perhaps, the Bill of Rights Committee cited
Brecht in its comments as an example that the right of privacy had
been already judicially recognized in Montana.1 7 In Brecht, the
court excluded evidence obtained through the violation of the de-
fendant's right of privacy by his sister-in-law, who had acted on
her own initiative, without state agency encouragement. 21 8 The del-
egates also were cognizant of a civil case, Welsh, in which the court
recognized the right as being fundamental and applied it in a dis-
pute between two private citizens."1 '
Irrespective of the delegates' intentions, until State v. Long220
was decided in 1984, the Montana Supreme Court had affirmed in
a long line of cases from Brecht in 1971 to State v. Van Haele221 in
1982 that the Montana Constitution protected against invasions of
privacy by private citizens irrespective of any state action. 222 These
cases expressed several rationales for applying the constitutional
privacy provision to actions by private persons.
In Brecht the Montana Supreme Court first applied what has
216. MONT. CONST. CONy., Vol. V, at 1681.
217. Id. Vol. II, at 632; See also Vol. V, at 1686-87 (mention of Brecht during floor
debate).
218. State v. Brecht, 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971).
219. Id. at 271; MONT. CONST. CONV., Vol. VI, at 1851. Since Brecht and Welsh were
the only cases where the right of privacy was previously addressed and since the delegate's
research briefs cited Welsh, see Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952),
they must have approved the concept. See supra note 72. See also per Delegate Campbell,
Transcript at 1851, ("As recently as 1952 ... Montana adopted the right by express holding
and with no misgiving.").
220. - Mont. -, 700 P.2d 153.
221. 199 Mont. 522, 649 P.2d 1311 (1982).
222. State v. Sayers, 199 Mont. 228, 648 P.2d 291 (1982); Hastelter v. Behan, -
Mont. -, 639 P.2d 510 (1982); State v. Hyem, - Mont. - , 630 P.2d 202 (1981);
Duran v. Buttrey Foods, Inc., - Mont. -, 616 P.2d 326 (1980); State v. Helfrich, 183
Mont. 484, 600 P.2d 816 (1979); State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 442 (1974);
Brecht, 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47.
19871
35
Elison and NettikSimmons: Right of Privacy
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1987
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
since been called the private search rule. The Brecht court based
its exclusion of the evidence on two grounds. First, the court not
only found that the sister-in-law's testimony about what the de-
fendant said while she was eavesdropping on his phone conversa-
tion constituted an invasion of privacy but also expressed a con-
cern that the defendant had, in effect, incriminated himself.223
Second, the court reasoned that to permit certain citizens to in-
vade privacy of persons while forbidding other citizens (state offi-
cials) from doing so would be absurd and unfair.224
In a subsequent case decided under the 1889 Montana Consti-
tution, State v. Coburn,225 the court used an expanded version of
what was called the "silver platter doctrine" as its rationale for
excluding evidence obtained by a private person through a search
violative of the right of privacy. The "silver platter doctrine" was
the phrase used to describe evidence obtained by state officials in
violation of federal law and subsequently delivered to federal
agents on a "silver platter. '2 6 Antagonism with the concept has
encouraged some courts to exclude evidence wrongfully seized by
quasi-law enforcement personnel, such as private security
guards.22
After the new rights provisions of the i972 Montana Constitu-
tion went into effect, a majority of the court placed less express
reliance on the Brecht and Coburn rationales and, instead, based
its holdings on Montana's unique constitutional right of privacy
provision.2 28 The court found that this provision demanded greater
protection for the right of privacy than the United States Consti-
tution.22' In fact, the Montana courts had afforded more protection
for the right of privacy than any other state. 30 Perhaps the unique
and colorful Montana history which witnessed the harsh actions of
vigilantes23' and yet has been committed to individuality, may par-
223. 157 Mont. at 270, 485 P.2d at 50.
224. Id. at 271, 485 P.2d at 51.
225. 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 442 (1974).
226. Originally such evidence was admitted since the federal exclusionary rule was not
applicable to state officials. Concern over the "silver platter doctrine" led to its early de-
mise. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
227. See, e.g. People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 352, 594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1979); See Van Haele, 199 Mont. at 353-56, 649 P.2d at 1317 (Morrison, J., concurring).
228. See, e.g., State v. Hyem, - Mont ..... 630 P.2d 202, 206, 208
(1981).
229. State v. Helfrich, 183 Mont. 484, 488-89, 600 P.2d 816, 817-18 (1979).
230. See supra notes 65 & 66.
231. For an interesting account of the exploits of vigilantes in Montana, see T. DIM-
SDALE, THE VIGILANTES OF MONTANA (1953); W. SANDERS, BISCUITS AND BADMEN (1983). It is
arguable, however, that excluding evidence in legal proceedings encourages vigilante actions.
See also Ranney, The Exclusionary Rule-The Illusion vs. The Reality, 46 MONT. L. REV.
[Vol. 48
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tially explain why the private search rule was invoked by the
Brecht court, and approved by the delegates to the 1972 Constitu-
tional Convention.
In addition to being supported by the transcript of the con-
vention, prior case law, and unique characteristics of Montana's
history, the constitutional protection against invasions of privacy
by individuals, as well as government, is supported by state consti-
tutional jurisprudence. Although the United States Constitution is
a delegation of powers by the people to the federal government,
rather than a delegation by the states, as were the Articles of Con-
federation,3 2 it is nonetheless a delegation. Thus, the United
States Constitution entails the granting of specific powers.2 s3 State
governments, on the other hand, have plenary governmental pow-
ers, except for those powers delegated by the people to the federal
government or expressly forbidden to both federal and state gov-
ernments.2 s3 These plenary powers traditionally have been called
police powers, i.e., the power to protect the health, safety, welfare,
and morals of society.23 5
These powers are given to the state by the persons who make
up that state. In terms of social contract theory, the constitution
represents that contract among the citizens of the state granting to
the state its police powers. 238 This contract is not between persons
289 (1985).
232. See Art. of Confederation art. II. ("Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom,
and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confedera-
tion expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled."). Cf. U.S. CONST.
Preamble ("We the people of the United States... do ordain and establish this Constitu-
tion for the United States of America.").
233. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 405 (1819) ("This government is
acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.") See also THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at
290 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888) ("The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite.").
234. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 402-06; see also Note, What is the Nature
of the Montana Constitution? 15 MONT. L. REV. 93 (1954). See also R. ROETTINGER, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STATE POLICE POWER (1957).
235. R. ROETTINGER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STATE POLICE POWER (1957).
236. See THE FEDERALIST No. 11 (A. Hamilton) ("Nothing is more certain than the
indispensable necessity of government; and it is equally undeniable that whenever and how-
ever it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest
it with requisite powers."); McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 404-05 ("The government of
the Union, then. . . is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form, and in
substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised
directly on them, and for their benefit.") See also W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN A REVOLU-
TIONARY ERA 145 (1980). Both the federal and the state Constitutions at least partially de-
rive from more simple and pure social compacts, such as the Mayflower Compact and the
Puritans' royal charter. See P. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY AND NARRATIVE
1987]
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and the state; for it is the contract itself that creates the state.
Rather, a state constitution is a contract among individual persons
to establish a state to protect their life, liberty and property.237
The creation of the state itself is an attempt to ensure a level of
due process for individuals in their relations with each other that
is not adequately achieved without a state. Thus, while the state
constitution limits state government, it also establishes and autho-
rizes it to carry out its police power functions. Because state con-
stitutions establish the police power of the state, they serve not
only as limitations on the institutions of government but also as a
statement of the guiding principles that the institutions of the gov-
ernment have a duty to advance and protect.23
The state fulfills its constitutional purpose only when it pro-
tects life, liberty and property. It can fail to do so in one of two
ways. First, as an institution it can oppress individuals and directly
jeopardize their life, liberty and property.2 9 A second and more
subtle failure is to negligently carry out its duties. Thus, if the
state fails to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens it
HISTORY 26-27 (1978).
237. See Locke, supra note 106, at § 123:
If a man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; If he be absolute lord
of his own Person and Possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no Body,
why will he part with his freedom? . . . [T]his empire, and subject himself to the
Dominion and Control of any other Power? To which, it is obvious to Answer, that
though in the state of Nature he hath such a right, yet the Enjoyment of it is very
uncertain, and constantly exposed to the Invasions of others. For all being Kings
as much as he, every Man his Equal, and the quarter part no strict Observers of
Equity and Justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very
unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a Condition, which however
free, is full of fears and continual danger: And it is not without reason, that he
seeks out, and is willing to joyn in Society with others who are already united, or
have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their Lives, Liberties, and
Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property.
238. See Id. at § 135:
The Obligations of the Law of Nature cease not in Society but only in many Cases
are drawn Closer, and have by Humane Laws known Penalties annexed to them,
to inforce their observation. Thus the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Role to
all Men, Legislators as well as others. The Rules that they make for other Men's
Actions, must, as well as their own and other Men's Actions, be conformable to
the Law of Nature . ...
See also J. Harlan's dissent in The Civil Rights Cases, 189 U.S. 3 (1883) (discussing the
affirmative duties of government. The absurd development of a "state action" requirement
by the U.S. Supreme Court in application of the sixth amendment is highlighted by the
reasoning in such cases as Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); and Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 315 (1974)).
239. This is the common variety of unconstitutional acts by government, such as tak-
ing property without just compensation, unreasonable searches and seizures, discriminating
laws or regulations, and deprivation of judicial and administrative due process.
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has violated its constitutional duties.2 40
The scope of this affirmative duty may be more or less clearly
expressed in the constitution. For example, in the individual dig-
nity provision, the Montana Constitution prohibits discrimination
by government or private groups or persons." 1 This would seem to
be a complete prohibition against discrimination by private per-
sons or agencies of government. There is no requirement of state
action. Perhaps the inalienable rights provision of the Montana
Constitution, however, best expresses an affirmative duty of per-
sons, as individuals and as government. That provision states that
"All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights ...
In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding re-
sponsibilities. ' '24 2 These responsibilities include respecting the
rights of others both as private individuals and as participants in
and agents of state government. Thus, even though the right of
privacy provision does not explicitly address invasions by private
citizens, the right of privacy does include the corresponding re-
sponsibility not to invade another's right.
The right to a clean environment does not include the words
private groups or persons as does the individual dignity provision.
However, since the most usual violators of a clean and healthy en-
vironment have been private corporate activities it is to be hoped
that the court will not demand "state action" before there is a con-
stitutional violation and some protection due.
In State v. Long2 43 the issues were confused. Obviously, indi-
viduals' rights of privacy are protected from infringement by other
individuals through the criminal and civil law and have been since
the birth of Anglo-American common law. An individual's right of
privacy is also protected from government infringement; however,
240. Though this point may be conceded, the truly difficult question is whether any
such action is justifiable, i.e., whether the court may mandate that the legislature pass cer-
tain laws or that an agency adopt certain procedures to ensure that life, liberty and property
are sufficiently protected. Given federal case law, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
such a contention would likely be held unjustifiable. See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-
TRUST (1980) (arguing that the courts are not to interject any substantive law into the demo-
cratic system but are merely to police the system and ensure that it operates democrati-
cally). However, it is arguable that if the institution is patently acting against the interests
of society as a whole, there is a malfunction somewhere in the democrative machinery.
241. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4:
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or in-
stitution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or politi-
cal rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or polit-
ical or religious ideas.
242. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
243. __ Mont. -, 700 P.2d 153 (1985).
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the government is sometimes granted limited exceptions by the
document protecting the right.2 44 For example, the right of privacy
is granted by the Montana Constitution at the same time it is lim-
ited by the provisions on unreasonable searches and seizures, as
well as the compelling state interest exception. Corollary problems
of enforcing a constitutional proscription of invasions of privacy by
private citizens should not be permitted to confuse the issue. The
typical and most effective remedy to date to restrain overzealous
agents of government who might violate privacy has been the ex-
clusionary rule.24 If considered solely as a deterrent, it becomes
most difficult to justify as a remedy for private wrongs that in-
fringe privacy.2 46 This does not mean, however, that non-govern-
mental infringement of privacy should not be accorded constitu-
tional protection; the inappropriateness of a single remedy to a
particular class of wrongdoers (here, private individuals) ought not
to diminish the constitutional significance of invasions of privacy
by the institutions of government or by individuals. The provision
still has significance as a constitutional foundation that makes it
the state's duty to prevent, punish and compensate for violations
of an individual's privacy by either the state or other persons.247
Thus, the state has a duty to provide effective, alternative reme-
dies to invasions of privacy by private individuals.4 8
244. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV and MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11 permit government to
trespass against persons, things or places so long as they comply with the probable cause
requirement.
245. But see Ranney, supra note 231 (arguing that the exclusionary rule is not an
effective remedy).
246. See State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 510-14, 530 P.2d 442, 454-56 (1974) (Castles,
J., dissenting). See also Note, State v. Brecht: Evolution or Offshoot of the Fourth Amend-
ment Exclusionary Rule? 34 MONT. L. REv. 187, 197 (1973).
247. Judicial enforcement of their duties, of course, would depend on the Montana
Supreme Court's construction of the scope of its judicial powers vis-a-vis the legislative and
the executive branch. It would also depend on the nature of the particular breach of duty in
question.
248. Consider other provisions of the Montana Constitution such as art. Ii, § 3 (the
environment provision). The principal potential invaders are large corporate concerns, not
government. Because of the requirement of state action, injured persons will not have a
direct constitutional claim but must rely on the whims of majority political attitudes ex-
pressed in legislation for the protection of environmental concerns often encountering over-
whelming special interest pressure from well financed corporate entities. This will be re-
quired notwithstanding, that the people of Montana established environmental concerns as
a first priority and that a clean and healthy environment was a fundamental right and was
to remain as such regardless of legislative activity until and unless the constitution itself
should be amended. One should also consider the rights of speech, press and religion which
should also be guaranteed against infringement by private persons as well as the state or
agents of the state.
[Vol. 48
40
Montana Law Review, Vol. 48 [1987], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol48/iss1/1
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
C. Exceptions to the Right of Privacy: What Constitutes a
Compelling State Interest?
The Montana Constitution permits infringement of the right
of privacy only if a compelling state interest for doing so is
shown.24 The clause requiring this showing was the subject of con-
siderable debate during the constitutional convention. Although
the provision, as it was drafted by the Bill of Rights Committee,
included the clause permitting an infringement where there is a
showing of a compelling state interest,2 50 the clause was stricken
during the floor debates. Delegate Harper, who made the motion
that the clause be stricken, stated that he was "a little worried
about that phrase 'without the showing of a compelling state inter-
est' because that may be interpreted by whatever state agency
happens to have an interest in invading my privacy at that particu-
lar time." 51 The motion passed unanimously.
Later in the debates, however, the clause was reinstated on the
motion of Delegate Ask. His concern was that without the clause,
the right was absolute and that the convention should give guid-
ance to the court about how to balance the right with other inter-
ests.2 52 But the delegates nevertheless intended that the right of
privacy be accorded a fundamental status in this balancing.2 3 In
the context of deleting a reference to invasions of privacy from the
search and seizure provision, the delegates believed that invasions
of privacy ought not be permitted on the mere basis of showing
probable cause.25 4 The compelling state interest requirement was
thought to address both concerns: the right of privacy is not abso-
lute but it is a fundamental right.
The compelling state interest standard is not unique to this
provision. It has long been interpreted to be required by the four-
teenth amendment under both the due process clause and the
equal protection clause when a fundamental right is infringed or a
suspect classification has been made.2 55 Early on, this standard fo-
cused primarily on the gravity of the threat of the prohibited con-
duct to any legitimate state interest rather than on the significance
of the state interest itself. For example, in an early fourteenth
amendment due process case, West Virginia State Board of Edu-
249. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
250. MONT, CONST. CONy., Vol. II, at 632.
251. Id. Vol. V, at 1682.
252. Id. Vol. VI, at 1852.
253. Id. Vol. VI, at 1851.
254. Id. Vol. V, at 1688.
255. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
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cation v. Barnette,5 the Court expressed what the state was re-
quired to demonstrate, if fundamental rights had been infringed.
Such rights "are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave
and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully
protect. '" 5 7 More recently, the Court has focused both on the sig-
nificance of the state interest at issue and the means used to fur-
ther that interest. For example, in Zablocki v. Redhail,2 58 a right of
privacy case, the Court stated that "[wihen a statutory classifica-
tion significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently im-
portant state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only
those interests."2 59
For the same reason that the Montana Supreme Court is not
bound to interpret the Montana Constitution's privacy provision
according to the Katz standard,2 0 it is free to interpret the privacy
provision's compelling state interest standard in a sense different
from the federal courts'. In making its interpretation, however, the
court should carefully consider the legal meaning that the clause
had when it wag adopted by the delegates. Clearly, their intent was
to classify the right as fundamental, although not absolute, and to
require a showing that more than just any state interest was at
stake; the interest must be compelling. 61
The Montana Supreme Court has never really defined what
compelling means and its determination of what constitutes a com-
pelling state interest has been made largely on an ad hoc basis.
Nevertheless, several patterns do emerge from its determinations.
First, in a number of cases the court has found that a need to pro-
tect property or one's person constitutes a compelling state inter-
est.26 2 Second, the court has cited the state's need to enforce its
256. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
257. Id. at 639.
258. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
259. Id. at 388.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 144-46.
261. See, e.g., Delegate Harper's remarks during the debate.
The reason I said it in the first place . . . "without the showing of a compelling
state interest" is not defined, at least clearly, in my mind as to who must show the
compelling interest, what it must be, and who decides what it must be . . . . I
guess I am just not that worried about the state taking care of itself as I am wor-
ried about the individual being able to take care of his own privacy.
MONT. CONST. CONy., Vol. VI, at 1852.
Delegate Campbell's remarks: "what it [the privacy provision] says is, don't come into
our private lives unless you have a good reason for being there." Id. Vol. V at 1681.
262. See State v. Bradford,__ Mont. - , - , 683 P.2d 924, 928 (1984); State ex
rel. Zander v. District Ct., 180 Mont. 548, 556, 591 P.2d 656, 660 (1979); see also State v.
Sayers, 199 Mont. 228, 231, 648 P.2d 291, 293 (1982).
[Vol. 48
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criminal laws as a compelling interest.23 Third, the need to protect
other state constitutional rights has been found to be a compelling
state interest.264 Fourth, the court held that a law enacted by the
people through the initiative process created a compelling state
interest.2 5
Some of these state interests invoked are clearly compelling in
the sense of being "very important," at least in the subjective eval-
uation of most people. For example, the need to protect other con-
stitutional rights is an important interest. Likewise, the similarity
between the process required to amend the Montana Constitution
and the initiative process 266 gives an aura of constitutionality to
laws passed by initiative. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in
drafting at least one other right, the right to know, the delegates
made its operation subject to the right of individual privacy.26 7 Ar-
guably, the principle implied by this act is that a collective good,
the right of the people of Montana to know what goes on in state
and local government, is subservient to an individual good, the
right of privacy.2 68 However, other fundamental rights, like free
speech, freedom of religion or a due process right to a fair trial that
pertain primarily to the individual, would be considered suffi-
ciently significant to constitute a compelling state interest, unless
otherwise expressly provided.
Other interests held by the court to be compelling are prob-
lematic in several respects. This can be demonstrated by the
court's repeated invocation of the protection of property as a com-
pelling state interest. First, though it is arguable that the right to
protect private property is as fundamental as the right of privacy,
balancing them becomes questionable when both rights belong to
the same person. Indeed, since the two are intimately related, it is
263. See State v. Wood, - Mont..., -, 666 P.2d 753, 754 (1983) (apprehen-
sion of felony suspects is compelling state interest); State v. Coleman, 189 Mont. 492, 503-
04, 616 P.2d 1090, 1096 (1980) (possible life sentence for selling amphetamines demonstrates
compelling state interest in apprehending such sellers); State v. Hall, 183 Mont. 511, 515,
600 P.2d 1180, 1182 (1979) (child abuse statutes demonstrate compelling state interest).
264. Montana Human Rights Division v. City of Billings, 199 Mont. 434, 444, 649 P.2d
1283, 1289 (1982) (to protect against discrimination is a compelling state interest).
265. Montana Auto. Ass'n v. Greely, - Mont. , -, 632 P.2d 300, 303 (1981).
266. Compare MONT. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 8 & 9 and MONT. CONST. art. III, § 4.
267. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
268. The right to know may also entail individual rights as well as collective rights.
E.g., an individual person may need to know what information a state agency has accumu-
lated about him to adequately protect his privacy or to purge inaccurate information that
might destroy his credit or his ability to obtain automobile insurance. Further, if the right
were not limited to state action the individual would have a much deserved and needed
constitutional right to demand access to any information accumulated about him by private
corporations such as banks or credit organizations.
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questionable whether they could truly conflict. Nevertheless, the
Montana Supreme Court believed that the two rights could and
did come in conflict even with respect to the same person. In State
ex rel. Zander v. District Court6 9 the court held that officers were
justified in violating the defendant's privacy when they conducted
a warrantless search of his home and found marijuana plants in
plain view. They were justified because their reason for entering
his house, the need to check out a reported burglary, constituted a
compelling state interest "to which the right of individual privacy
must yield. 2 °7 0
Second, even if the right to own and protect property is a fun-
damental right, it is dangerous to permit a state agency to invoke
an abstract fundamental right, like this right concerning property,
without also showing that the right was imminently threatened in
a substantial way.2 7 1 The court's analysis of the property right in
Zander failed to take this problem into account. In other cases,
however, the court seems to have required some balancing of the
right of privacy with the particular compelling interest invoked.
For example, in Duran v. Buttrey Food, Inc. ,272 the court rejected
the dissent's compelling state interest analysis, which simply
stated that "the protection of a person's property furnishes a com-
pelling state interest to which the right of individual privacy must
yield. 2 73 In Duran a criminal statute1 4 purported to grant a pri-
vate person the power to stop and detain another private person
for up to thirty minutes and to allow the public search of a purse,
all of which caused indignity and embarrassment. Instead of sim-
ply invoking the compelling state interest in property, the court
balanced the two rights. In doing so, though implicitly acknowledg-
ing that in the abstract the protection of property is a compelling
state interest, the court "fail[ed] to discern a compelling state in-
terest which would justify the very serious invasion of a person's
privacy. "275 A similar balancing was suggested by the court in
State v. Carlson,2 76 in which it noted the need to limit searches
269. 180 Mont. 548, 591 P.2d 656 (1979).
270. Id. at 556, 591 P.2d at 661.
271. It is an interesting aside that in this case the court found a fundamental constitu-
tional right, which the state had a compelling interest to affirmatively protect from un-
known third parties, to justify the invasion of a second fundamental right by agents of the
state.
272. 189 Mont. 381, 616 P.2d 327 (1980).
273. Id. at 392, 616 P.2d at 333. See also id. at 398, 616 P.2d at 336 (Haswell, C. J.,
and Harrison, J., dissenting).
274. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-503 (1985).
275. Duran, 189 Mont. at 392, 616 P.2d at 333 (emphasis added).
276. 198 Mont. 113, 644 P.2d 498 (1982).
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and seizures "under circumstances where the privacy rights of the
offended party exceeded the compelling state interest of the state
in making the intrusion. ' '377
This balancing of the degree of invasion of privacy against the
claimed state interest at stake might justifiably affect the quality
of probable cause necessary to justify a particular search or seizure.
For example, in State v. Olson 78 the court held that smell alone is
not probable cause "sufficient to justify the invasion of the privacy
of one's home. '2 7' Perhaps for similar but implicit reasons, the
court in a prior case, State v. Schoenthaller,2 80 found the officer's
smell of marijuana to be insufficient probable cause to search the
defendant's car when he had been stopped for a violation of a traf-
fic ordinance.
Further, in both Duran and Carlson the court's language sug-
gested that a third facet of the compelling interest requirement
was considered in its balancing. In the kind of general balancing
that the court performed, the invasiveness of the means was taken
into account in the court's evaluation.2 81 Means less restrictive of
the right of privacy resulting in less invasive governmental intru-
sion may have been permissible. More recently, in State v. Si-
erra,28 2 the Montana Supreme Court explicitly adopted as part of a
compelling state interest analysis the requirement that even if the
state has a compelling state interest it must pursue this interest by
means that are the least restrictive of the fundamental right to be
infringed.
The court also seems to have implicitly considered this princi-
ple of least restrictive means in the Montana Human Rights Divi-
sion case, where the government intrusion had not yet occurred.
Even though the court held that a compelling state interest existed
for requiring the City of Billings to provide its personnel files to
the Human Rights Division, it took precautions to be as protective
as possible of the privacy interests involved. The court order was
277. Id. at 123-24, 644 P.2d at 503-04 (citing State v. Hyem, - Mont. -, 630
P.2d 202 (1981); State v. Allen, - Mont. -, 612 P.2d 199 (1980)) (emphasis added).
278. 180 Mont. 151, 589 P.2d 663 (1979).
279. Id. at 155, 589 P.2d at 665. A rather dubious conclusion based on the level of
probable cause that could be ascertained by "smell" in the case of marijuana as compared
with other acceptable levels of probable cause. The case is more rationally predicated on the
degree of invasion vis-a-vis the seriousness of the crime.
280. 176 Mont. 376, 578 P.2d 730 (1978).
281. Duran, 189 Mont. at 392, 616 P.2d at 333 (causing great indignity and embarrass-
ment, without making an arrest); Carlson, 198 Mont. at 121-22, 644 P.2d at 502-03 (full
custodial arrest of defendant, half asleep and in underwear, for failing to comply with order
to appear that was never served).
282. - Mont. - , 692 P.2d 1273 (1985).
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fashioned to protect privacy by limiting the information that the
Human Rights Division could obtain.83
A similar concern about restricting the means used by the
state to intrude upon the privacy of individuals has been expressed
by Justice Shea, in dissents, as well as in writing for the court. His
concern, which has also been a long-time concern of the Montana
Supreme Court,2  was that the use of warrants and the procedure
for obtaining them should be strictly enforced by the courts since
the purpose of warrants is to minimize the invasion of privacy.2 8
On the other hand, there is a basis for arguing from the com-
ments of the Bill of Rights Committee that, at least as far as
search and seizures are concerned, the means need not be the least
restrictive but only reasonable. This inference could be made from
their comment that the search and seizure provision would be the
procedural counterpart of the privacy provision.286 Nevertheless,
even if two distinct standards were intended, it would be inappro-
priate for the court simply to adhere to what federal courts believe
to be reasonable means under the federal Constitution, which does
not require a compelling state interest for invasions of privacy by
search and seizures, but only requires that they be reasonable.2 8 7 In
other words, in conjunction with Montana's right of privacy rea-
sonableness might very well require that the least restrictive means
be used to make searches and seizures.
F. What Are The Remedies For Invasions of Privacy?
The Montana Constitution's privacy provision does not sug-
gest what remedy persons should have for potential or imminent
violations of their privacy. Montana cases, however, provide exam-
ples of three different kinds of remedies.
First, in a criminal proceeding, evidence that has been unlaw-
fully seized through an invasion of the defendant's privacy may be
excluded. 88 Montana was one of the first states to adopt its own
exclusionary rule, years before the United States Supreme Court
required states to apply it. In 1925, the court in State ex rel. King
283. Montana Human Rights Div., 199 Mont. at 449, 649 P.2d at 1291.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 58 & 59.
285. See, e.g., Sierra, Mont. -, 692 P.2d 1273 (per Shea, J.); State v. Fogarty,
187 Mont. 393, 610 P.2d 140 (1980) (per Shea, J.); State v. Meader, 184 Mont. 32, 44, 601
P.2d 386, 392 (1979) (Shea, J., concurring) (seizure of items beyond those described in the
warrant would have violated defendant's right of privacy).
286. See MONT. CONST. CONy., Vol. II, at 633.
287. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
288. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-302 (1985).
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v. District Court289 discussed the exclusionary rule as the only ef-
fective means of enforcing the Montana state search and seizure
provision. The court stated its disapproval of "courts... claiming
admiration for the high and splendid principle of the constitu-
tional mandate [against unreasonable searches and seizures], [who]
refuse to put it into effect. That is not our idea of enforcing the
law; it is mere lip service."290
The Montana Supreme Court in Brecht, and after adoption of
the express constitutional right of privacy, from Coburn until
State v. Long, dared to take seriously its constitutional mandate.
As recently as 1982 in State v. Van Haele,291 the court excluded
evidence resulting from an invasion of the defendant's privacy by a
private citizen. The court's rationale for doing so went beyond the
current singlefold deterrence rationale of the United States Su-
preme Court as it was expressed in United States v. Calandra.292
Instead, the court stated:
We base our reasoning on the firm stance taken by the Montana
Constitution guaranteeing an individual's right of privacy. Our
holding today is also rooted in the concept of judicial integrity,
i.e., the judicial system must not become an accomplice to consti-
tutional violations by admitting evidence illegally obtained.293
Consistent with this rationale, the court in Van Haele refused to
permit a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because it
only addresses a deterrence rationale, not the judicial integrity ra-
tionale invoked by the court.
Most recently, in State v. Long,294 however, the Montana Su-
preme Court recanted. State v. Van Haele was overruled along
with all cases expressing similar sentiments.2 9 The court swal-
lowed the federal theory that the exclusionary rule is no more than
a rule of court procedure designed to deter unlawful police activi-
ties.290 Although the Montana Supreme Court discussed the con-
cept of "judicial integrity" as a possible justification for applying
the exclusionary rule to private action, it declined to do so in that
case. Nevertheless, it made a most unique distinction. If the pri-
vate party invading ones privacy and illegally seizing evidence
289. 70 Mont. 191, 224 P. 862 (1924).
290. Id. at 197, 224 P. at 864.
291. 199 Mont. 522, 649 P.2d 1311 (1982), overruled by State v. Long, - Mont.
-, 700 P.2d 153 (1985).
292. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
293. 199 Mont. at 526, 649 P.2d at 1313.
294. - Mont. -, 700 P.2d 153.
295. Id. at , 700 P.2d at 156.
296. Id. at -, 700 P.2d at 157-58.
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commits no more than a misdemeanor (a trespass in the case dis-
cussed), the admission of the evidence does not impinge on judicial
integrity. " ' But the court then "reserve[d] for another day the de-
termination of whether to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence
gathered as the result of felonious conduct." 98 This unusual dis-
tinction, which would make the decision to exclude evidence seized
illegally by a private person turn on the level of illegality, seems to
be a confusing measure of obeisance to the principled concept of
judicial integrity. Further, it fails to relate this conclusion to the
court's first assertion in Long that there was no constitutional vio-
lation in any event since the constitutional provision only protects
against state action. 9 Is the court's use of privately illegally seized
evidence the necessary "state action" to call into play the constitu-
tional mandate prohibiting illegal search and seizure? Would it
also require the court, as a matter of judicial integrity, to exclude
the evidence if the illegality is substantial, that is, felonious? Only
time will tell.
Nevertheless, the exclusionary rule remains a possible remedy
for violations of privacy insofar as the violation is by govern-
ment. °0  The apparent commitment of the Montana court to follow
indiscriminately the federal lead, however, forces one to conclude
that the vitality of the exclusionary rule in Montana will be short-
lived.301
A second remedy that has been provided by the court is a pro-
tective order. This is what the City of Billings sought in Montana
Human Rights Division.30 2 This remedy provides the court with
some flexibility to accommodate the privacy interest in the face of
a compelling state interest. Although the city was not able to pre-
vent the agency from obtaining the personnel files, the court did
fashion an order to "establish some substantial protection of the
privacy of those individuals . ".3.."803 Presumably, where there is
no compelling state interest, an injunction would be granted.
Third, there is, at least potentially, a remedy in tort. The
court has left this possibility open. In Hastetter v. Behan,3°4 a dis-
trict court had dismissed the plaintiff's action in tort, based on the
297. Id. at -, 700 P.2d at 158.
298. Id.
299. Id. at -, 700 P.2d at 157.
300. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Shepard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States V. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984) (The federal exclusionary rule has been limited.)
301. Id.
302. 199 Mont. 434, 649 P.2d 1283.
303. Id. at 446, 649 P.2d at 1290.
304. 196 Mont. 280, 639 P.2d 510 (1982).
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violation of his constitutional right of privacy, because the defend-
ant was not a state official, and his invasive act was not done in
conjunction with state activities. The Montana Supreme Court,
however, reversed the district court, suggesting that the constitu-
tional provision did create a cause of action in tort. The court then
dismissed the plaintiff's suit, holding that he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the identity of the phone numbers he
calls. 05 Although this plaintiff brought the privacy action under
the Montana Constitution's right of privacy provision, obviously
there were available tort remedies for violation of privacy based in
the common law of torts. For example, in the Long case the de-
fendant should have a potential tort cause of action for the "tres-
pass." But the question as to whether there is a constitutional tort
predicated on the constitutional right of privacy if a non-state em-
ployee infringes individual privacy seems most dubious after the
Long decision.
Further, there is no assurance that a "constitutional tort"
remedy would be available if an agent of government (state action)
violated a constitutional right of privacy 06 Montana's constitu-
tional waiver of sovereign immunity 0 7 and the court's interpreta-
tion of the right to a judicial remedy0 8 could provide, however, a
basis for an implied constitutional cause of action against either
the state or a state official who invades plaintiff's privacy.
Finally, other remedies that are at least theoretically possible
are administrative sanctions against individual employees of gov-
ernment who violate a citizen's right of privacy.309 And, of course,
many serious invasions of privacy constitute crimes such as tres-
pass, burglary, theft, and assault. Thus, criminal actions could and
should be brought against either private persons or government
agents who knowingly or purposely violate a citizen's privacy. Un-
fortunately in those cases in which the exclusion of evidence is a
possible remedy there is rarely if ever a criminal prosecution.
V. CONCLUSION
Privacy is a fundamental right and perhaps more. It may well
be the foundation of civilized society. It is the right "to be let
305. Id. at 283, 639 P.2d at 513.
306. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (the U.S. Supreme Court
permitted such a claim).
307. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 18.
308. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16. See also White v. State, - Mont. -. , 661 P.2d
1272 (1983).
309. See Ranney, supra note 231, at 303.
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alone" by other persons, as well as by government. It encompasses
concepts of both tort and crimes and assures protection from pri-
vate and governmental intrusions. While it is not absolute, it is
fundamental.
The question of "state action" generates additional confusion.
It was misplaced from the beginning. The refusal to protect basic
human rights in the Civil Rights Cases1 0 was insensitive and a
continuing source of frustration.311 The question should be simply
whether the claimant or petitioner is being denied a basic right
guaranteed by the constitution and whether another right is in
conflict therewith. This should be true whether the right is a first
amendment right of free speech, a fifteenth amendment right to
vote or a nontextual right of privacy. What difference does it make
if a private person detains me and I am denied the right to vote
and the state declines to protect me, or an agent of the state ref-
uses to accept my ballot. In either event I have been denied the
right to vote, a fundamental political right.
If state action should not be the issue in applying the federal
Constitution and there are strong arguments that it should not,
31 2
310. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). These cases involved exclusion of black
persons by private persons and private corporations (railroads) from public facilities and
conveyances because of their race. Indictments and the civil penalty invoked were reversed.
The court held the fourteenth amendment was not applicable since the cases did not involve
state action. Montana's constitutional response to this problem is addressed in the specific
language of Article II. While the court may have been legally and philosophically correct in
its holding in the Civil Rights Cases, that does not mean the same reasoning should extend
to the interpretation of a state constitution. In fact, one of the principal arguments in sup-
port of the majority position in the Civil Rights Cases was that if Congress had power to
protect these rights against private deprivations it would be a usurpation by the federal
government of state functions in violation of the principles inherent in the tenth amend-
ment. Implicitly then the protection of the rights should be an obligation of state govern-
ment, and such basic rights should appropriately be included in a state constitution.
311. It was most insensitive in a humanistic sense, to tell the states to protect the
rights of the black citizens knowing full well the political power base and the general atti-
tude of those persons in control of state government. Insensitive at least as considered from
the perspective of a new morality and a hundred years of hindsight. As a continuing source
of frustration, the court has turned and twisted for the last 40 years to find violations of the
fourteenth amendment even though the actions condemned were not state actions, at least
not in any traditional sense. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
A direct reversal of the civil rights cases has not been forthcoming but in United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), a majority of the justices seemed to hold that Congress could
regulate private actions. Amalgomated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968) overruled by Hodgens v. National Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507 (1976);
and see the absurd results in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). By
extension of the reasoning in the Jackson case a person could be denied electricity by a
"privately" owned electric utility company on the basis of race and have no claim to consti-
tutional protection.
312. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Guest, 383 U.S.
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it definitely is not an appropriate question in the interpretation of
a state constitution. As noted in Katz3 1 3 "[t]he protection of per-
son's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other
people . . is . . . left largely to the law of the individual states."
And the people of the state of Montana spoke loud and clear. The
right of privacy is fundamental and should protect against in-
fringement by private persons as well as government officials. The
difficult question should never be state action; but if constitution-
ally guaranteed rights collide, how should they be valued in rela-
tion to each other and how can the particular conflict be resolved
with the minimum restriction on either right?
Isolated determinations such as the conclusion that phone
numbers are not protected by the right of privacy314 are trouble-
some but focus on the scope of protection provided by the privacy
concept. Disagreement as to the scope of privacy is understanda-
ble. Likewise, elimination of the exclusionary rule in relation to il-
legal private searches is a discouraging reliance on the recent fed-
eral conclusion that the rule is justified only as a deterrent.
Nonetheless, it is understandable if not expected. But the unneces-
sary plummet into the federal maze of "state action" will cause the
Montana court untold grief and tend to result in a misfocus of the
real issues. One need only read a handful of the federal cases to be
assured of this conclusion."'
It should be noted that the right of privacy is of sufficient
breadth and sufficiently confused, in the best legal tradition, to
defy truly satisfactory definition, generally acceptable analysis or
anything approaching complete historical or philosophical descrip-
tion. Nonetheless, the concept is useful and can be defined, ana-
lyzed, and made pertinent. The first step has been taken. The right
has been given formal, textual, and constitutional recognition in
Montana, as well as recognition in the U.S. Constitution. Inclusion
in the state constitution is an expression by the people of a funda-
mental value not to be infringed by government and more, a value
to be protected by government from infringement by private
persons.
The process of definition and analysis has begun. Ultimately
"privacy" will become one of the most encompassing and signifi-
cant concepts in law. Its mention will force decision-makers to con-
745.
313. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
314. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). See also Hastetter v. Behan, 196 Mont.
280, 639 P.2d 510 (1982).
315. See supra note 311.
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sider the meaning of human autonomy and dignity on the one
hand and the procedural and substantive limits of governmental
control on the other.
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